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Abstract
Cognitive behavioral theories suggest that depressed people have negatively distorted and
inaccurate perceptions and cognitions. The present study measures the accuracy of
cognitions by comparing predictions made by depressed and by nondepressed students
when they estimate the scores they will earn on an examination. It also compares
depressed and nondepressed students on their levels of satisfaction with their exam
scores. No difference was found between depressed and nondepressed students in either
their predictions of their exam grades or their level of satisfaction with their exam grades.
This study fails to support the notion that depression correlates with negative cognitive
distortions. Depressed and nondepressed students were alike in their cognitive accuracy
in predicting exam grades and in their cognitive satisfaction level with their grades.
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1

Realism or Distortion in Predicting and Evaluating Exam Performance Among Depressed
and Nondepressed Students

There is a growing body of cognitive-behavioral literature suggesting that
depressed patients are predisposed to negative distortions in their thought processes.
Freeman and Oster (1999) have gone so far as to suggest that some depressed people
have dysfunctional beliefs that rise to the level of almost fixed delusional quality. For
example, Freeman and Oster describe a depressed patient who believes himself to be
unloved and unlovable, in spite ofthe fact that 98.3 percent of the people in that
depressed individual's life fmd him to be quite lovable. To maintain the belief in himself
as unlovable, the patient must somehow distort his thinking to discount or explain away
the vast majority of people in his life who love him. This is the kind of negatively
distorted thinking that becomes the central focus oftreatment interventions for cognitivebehavioral therapists working with depressed patients. Cognitive-behavioral therapists
strive to help depressed patients eliminate their negative cognitive distortions and think
more accurately and realistically.
The research literature, however, does not consistently support the notion that
those who are depressed think in a distorted manner. There are numerous studies that
support the position that people who suffer from depression tend to be more negative in
their thinking than those who do not suffer from depression (e.g. Alloy, Abramson,
Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997). It is not clear, however, that the negative thoughts
and beliefs of the depressed are distorted or inaccurate. In met, there is evidence that
suggests the depressed are more accurate in their perceptions and judgments, but the
nondepressed tend to distort their thinking in an overly positive direction (e.g. Alloy &
Abramson, 1979). The conclusion that depressed people are more negative in their
thinking is not disputed. The controversy arises when researchers suggest that the
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negative thoughts of the depressed are distortions. That is the area in which research
[mdings differ and are not conclusive. What is in dispute is not the negativity of the
thoughts and beliefs for the depressed but the accuracy of those thoughts and beliefs.
Because there is no clear consensus in the literature regarding the accuracy or the
distortion of the thoughts, be Hefs, and perceptions 0 f either the depressed or the
nondepressed, further study is necessary.
The fIrst section of this paper will examine the cognitive-behavioral theOlY of
depression as proposed by Aaron Beck. Dr. Beck's concept of cognitive schema will be
explained along with its influence on the thinking of people who have depressive
symptoms. The next section of the paper will explore the research literature that
demonstrates the fact that those who suffer from depression are more negative in their
thinking than their counterparts who do not suffer from depression.
Depressive realism will be examined in the next section of the paper. Depressive
realism is the notion that those who have depressive symptoms are actually more realistic
and accurate in their thinking than those who do not have depressive symptoms. This
concept suggests that depression tends to allow people to see things more realistically,
while those who are not depressed have an unjustifIed and unrealistic optimism that
distorts their thinking in an overly positive direction.
A number of studies are then reviewed that shed light on the accuracy of the
cognitions of depressed research participants with regard to their social performance.
Research [mdings in the area of social performance and self-evaluations of that social
performance are complex and unclear. There is evidence to suggest that depressed people
are more realistic and accurate in evaluating their own social performance, including their
impact on others. There is also evidence to suggest that the depressed see themselves in a
more negative light than their social interaction partners see them. There is further
evidence indicating that depression in one partner of a social dyad influences the
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nondepressed partner to alter his or her social interactions and actually to behave in a
more negative manner.
Attributional theory is explained in the next section of the paper. Cognitive
attributions can influence peoples' reactions to negative events as well as to positive
events that occur in their lives. With some patterns of attribution, depressive symptoms
I

become less likely while other attributional patterns seem to increase the likelihood of
depression as an emotional reaction when negative or unpleasant events occur.
The next sections of the paper deal with possible gender-effects in research on
depression and the use of self-report instruments in depression research. The research
literature does not suggest that gender plays an influential role in studies of judgment, of
perception, or of predictions made by depressed and nondepressed participants. Selfreport psychological tests are used in the research design described in this paper.
Therefore, the strengths and limitations of self-report psychological measures are
reviewed.
The research methodology is then described in detail. The present study measures
the accuracy of cognitions by comparing predictions made by depressed and by
nondepressed students when they estimate the scores they will eam on a fInal
examination for school. It also compares depressed and nondepressed students on their
level of satisfaction with their exam scores.

Review of the Literature

Aaron Beck's cognitive-behavioral theory of depression involves cognitive
distortions or faulty information processing as a core concept (Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979, Beck & Freeman, 1990; Beck, 1996). Beck suggested that
depressed persons perceive situations negatively when a more positive interpretation is
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equally possible and more accurate. His cognitive triad of depression involves an
inclination to view the self, the world, and the future in anegative light. According to
Beck's theory, the depressed person's cognitions are negatively biased and operate by
filtering out positive information, exaggerating negative interpretations instead. These
negative expectations and interpretations lead to depressed affect.
In Beck's theory, schema are used to explain systematic patterns of errors in
thought or in cognitive distortions made by depressed persons. Schema are cognitive
structures derived from past experiences that operate to interpret and give meaning to
current experiences. They guide subsequent perceptions and judgments. For instance,
negative self-schema can lead depressed people to view themselves as unworthy and
undesirable. This view, in turn, can bias their judgments of events so that they appear to
be evidence of failure or rejection. Information that is not consistent with the negative
schema is overlooked or ignored; confIrmatory data, however, is given undue weight.
Segal (1988) explains it well when he writes, "Cognitive distortions are the products of
the misinterpretation or misperception of objective reality in such a way that the
conclusions reached by depressed people confIrm their negative expectations" (p. 148).
The cognitive theories of depression (Beck, 1967; Ellis, 1973; Seligman, 1975)
have been extremely influential in explaining the phenomenon of depression and in
shaping the therapeutic interventions used to treat it. The cognitive approaches generally
suggest that patients' patterns ofthinking are the foundations oftheir affective life, and
that negative thought patterns produce and maintain depression. Therapeutic
interventions are often designed to help the patient become aware of negative cognitions
that lead to depression. Therapeutic improvement is fostered by guiding patients to
eliminate negatively distorted perceptions in order to become more accurate in their
cognitive assessments and conclusions. Therapists, for instance, will sometimes
encourage depressed patients to be more empirical in their judgments and to evaluate
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more accurately the "data" of their life-experiences. In short, patients are encouraged to
correct inaccurate conclusions that they are imposing on events and to be more realistic in
their understanding of events. Patients may be asked to conduct behavioral experiments
as part of the therapy process. If patients believe that they are unpopular and that people
dislike them, they may be encouraged to ask a sample of 10 people whom they know if
they are liked or disliked. When some of those surveyed respond favorably, the depressed
patients are encouraged to reevaluate their negative cognitions regarding unpopularity
and worthlessness. Such a cognitive-behavioral approach is based on the notion that
depressed persons' thoughts are distorted, inaccurate, and incorrect. In therapy, patients
attempt to experience events in a less biased way in order to shift negative cognitive
distortions in a more positive and accurate direction.

Depressed Are More Negative Than Nondepressed

A variety of studies have demonstrated the fact that the depressed are more aware
of and more active in processing negative self-referent information when compared with
the nondepressed (Alloy, Abramson, Murray, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997; Gara,
Woolfold, Cohen, & Goldston, 1993; Gotlib, 1982; Nelson & Craighead, 1977; Segal,
Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995; Wenzlaff & Grozier, 1988). These studies
support the notion that depressed people are more negative in their thinking in that they
are more aware of negative feedback. However, increased awareness does not necessarily
mean distortion. Without some independent measure of reality, we cannot conclude that
depressed people are negatively distorting reality, just that they have a heightened
awareness ofthe negative aspects of reality. It remains possible that those who are
depressed are actually experiencing a more negative reality than those who are not
depressed. This is exactly the conclusion suggested by Coyne and Gotlib (1983). They
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are critical of the conclusion that the cognitive theorists have offered which suggests that
depression is the result of negative distortions of reality. Coyne and Gotlib offer the
alternative hypothesis that depression is produced and maintained by negative life
circumstances that are accurately perceived by the depressed person. Coyne and Gotlib
agree that depressed persons evaluate themselves and their performance more negatively
than do nondepressed controls, but they question whether these evaluations are
distortions. They suggest, instead, that depression is more closely related to actual
environmental antecedents and consequences and is not determined by cognitive
distortions of reality. They believe that negative realities produce and maintain
depression rather than negative cognitions that distort reality.
In an interesting demonstration of negative realities, Swann, Hixon, and De La
Ronde (1997) found that marriage partners were most committed to spouses who
confirmed their own self-view. That was also true when that self-view was negative.
Depressed persons were more committed to spouses who shared their negative view of
themselves than to spouses who had a more positive view than they, themselves, held.
Therefore, depressed people with negative self-concepts were more committed to their
marriages if their spouses held negative views of them than if their spouses held more
positive views of them. This study seems to provide evidence that depression and
negative self-conceptions become self-fulfilling. Awareness of negative feedback about
the self among the depressed becomes increasingly confirmed and is, therefore,
increasingly accurate within the depressed person's environment. This may be the result
of the depressed person's tendency to associate selectively with people who confIrm their
own beliefs about their inadequacies and unworthiness.
Alloy and Ahrens (1987) found that depressed college students were more
pessimistic than nondepressed students when predicting future successes and failures.
Both depressed and nondepressed participants predicted more successes than failures in
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their futures. However, the depressed group was much more pessimistic than the
nondepressed group when forecasting future events in their own lives as well as in the
lives of hypothetical others similar to themselves. The nondepressed group showed more
optimism in their predictions for their own future.
One study demonstrated physiological evidence of increased negative
expectations among the depressed (Blackburn, Roxborough, Muir, Glabus, &
Blackwood, 1990). Event Related Potentials (ERPs) are physiological reactions that
reflect information processing activities within the brain. The amplitude of the ERP is
assumed to be an empirical measure of the strength of information processing within the
individual. Information that is consistent with the individual's expectations requires a
lower amplitude response to process than information that is inconsistent with the
individual's expectations. Depressed participants showed lower amplitude responses to
negative stimuli than to neutral or positive stimuli. Nondepressed participants showed
larger amplitude responses to negative stimuli than to neutral or positive stimuli. The
authors conclude that those who are depressed expect negative information and process
that information with less effort, while the nondepressed are more easily aroused by
negative stimuli because it is inconsistent with their expectations.

Depressive Realism and Accuracy

Alloy and Abramson (1979) shook the foundations of the cognitive theory of
depression when they conducted a study in which depressed participants were more
accurate in their judgments than the nondepressed participants who demonstrated a
tendency to distort their perceptions in a positive direction. They tested a deduction from
the learned helplessness model (Seligman, 1975) which hypothesized that depressed
individuals will underestimate the degree of contingency between their behavior and
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environmental outcomes. The model suggests that having learned to be helpless,
depressed people will not expect their actions to lead to results. Participants were asked
to press a button or not to press a button. The environmental outcome was a green light
that either turned on or did not tum on. Participants were then asked to estimate the
degree of contingency between their button-pressing and the onset of the light.
Undergraduates from the University of Pennsylvania were studied and were assigned to
depressed and nondepressed groups on the basis oftheir Beck Depression Inventory
scores. Green light onset was fixed at 25%,50%, and 75% levels and was not contingent
upon whether the students pushed the button or not. When the outcome (onset ofthe
light) occurred infrequently (25%), both the depressed and the nondepressed groups were
accurate in estimating the percentage of light-onset when they pushed the button and
when they did not. However, when the light-onset became more frequent, the
nondepressed participants developed an illusion of control believing their behavior was
controlling the illumination ofthe light. That is, they overestimated how much control
they had. The depressed participants, rather than underestimating their control (as they
might ifthey felt helpless), were more accurate in their judgments than the nondepressed
participants. They seemed to detect correctly the noncontingency between their responses
and the outcomes. Indeed, they seemed to have an accurate, not distorted, perception of
their control in the experimental task. The nondepressed participants displayed a
cognitive distortion in this task rather than the depressed participants.
Dobson and Pusch (1995) repeated the Alloy and Abramson experimental design
using 15 clinically depressed, 15 remitted, and 15 never-depressed subjects. Their results
did not confll'm the Alloy and Abramson findings. The results indicated the depressed
participants overestimated their degree of control by 43% and were not more realistic
than the other two groups. In fact, all three groups demonstrated positively biased
distortions; however, depressed people showed neither more accuracy nor more distortion
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than their nondepressed peers. The Dobson and Pusch study utilized clinically depressed
patients as participants while the Alloy and Abramson study used students who reported
depressive signs but who were not clinically diagnosed nor in treatment.
A number of studies have substantiated the fact that depressed participants, both
students and patients, make accurate judgments in tasks of skill or of chance such as dice
I

games (Go lin, Terrell, & Johnson, 1977; Golin, Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 1979; Smolen,
1978). It tends to be the nondepressed participants who distort reality by developing an
illusion of control involving chance tasks in which their behavior is not influencing the
outcome. When reinforcement is frequent, though independent of the participant's
control, nondepressed people are especially likely to believe they are controlling the
reinforcement (Langer, 1975a; Langer, 1975b; Miller & Ross, 1975; Tennen & Sharp,
1983 Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998). This may, in part, explain the popularity
of gambling. Vazquez (1987) found that both depressed and nondepressed participants
make accurate judgments of the degree of contingency between their actions and
outcomes when there is no reward, such as money, for correct judgments. When a reward
was involved, the nondepressed (but not the depressed) showed an illusion of control in
noncontingent (chance) situations. However, the depressed showed an illusion of control
when the outcomes were negative in nature. When the outcome involved negative selfreferent sentences, the depressed participants overestimated the degree of contingency
between their responses and the appearance of negative self-referent sentences. That is,
when negative statements about the self were the motivator instead of money, the
depressed participants showed the distorted cognitions. They thought they were
controlling the frequency of the negative statements. The author comments that excessive
self-blame in the depressed may result in bias and distortion as they perceive the
contingency between their acts and negative consequences.
Tang and Critelli (1990) studied depressive realism in mildly depressed students
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using moneyas an incentive and employing immediate feedback and repeated tasks in
order to allow participants to learn from experience. The mildly depressed made more
accurate judgments and the nondepressed overestimated their control. "When given
feedback and further task exposure, mild depressives showed the ability to learn from
experience and to modify their judgments of control; however, the nondepressives did
not. The authors suggested that depressives may not be motivated by self-esteem, which
is already low, while nondepressed participants may protect and enhance their selfesteem by maintaining an illusion of controL Ifthis is true, it is certainly a flawed
strategy for the nondepressed as it is likely to lead to larger disappointments and failures
through denial and illusion. An experimental shift in focus to the disadvantages or the
costs of taking ineffective action tends to improve the accuracy of judgments among
nondepressed participants (Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1988). That is, the
nondepressed seem to develop a positively distorted bias about their level of control
when pursuing rewards but become more realistic and accurate when trying to avoid
negative consequences.
Nelson and Craighead (1977) reported that depressed participants recalled less
positive and more negative feedback than did controls in tests of memory for positive and
negative feedback. This fmding supports the notion of a negatively distorted bias among
the depressed. However, the depressed participants were more accurate about the actual
amount of negative feedback received, but the nondepressed group underestimated
negative feedback. In their study, Nelson and Craighead provided both positive and
negative feedback to depressed and nondepressed participants. When positive feedback
was high and negative feedback was low, the depressed participants recalled feedback
that was less positive and more negative than their nondepressed peers. The depressed
participants were more accurate in their recall of the negative feedback, however, while
the nondepressed tended to underestimate it. The authors comment that nondepressives
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tend to filter out a certain amount of low frequency negative feedback, possibly to
preserve their self-image. The depressed group remained more sensitive to all instances
of aversive stimulation and were more fully able to recall it. In this study the depressives
were more accurate about the negative but less accurate about the positive feedback,
indicating that distortions
may be unidirectional. While negative feedback is given an
,
accurate amount of perception and recall, positive feedback is underestimated. The net
effect is that a larger proportion of negative feedback is processed relative to its presence
in the environment, though its absolute value is accurate and realistic. Negative
distortions, therefore, may occur more in the relative weight assigned to incoming
information than in the absolute accuracy of the information. Additionally, accuracy
among the depressed may be better with negative than with positive information. In a
commentary on four studies, Alloy and Lipman (1992) pointed out that depressed
participants seemed to prefer an evenhanded mixture of favorable and unfavorable
appraisals; the nondepressed participants, however, show a bias for favorable feedback
about themselves.
Schwartz and Garamoni (1986) proposed a model of positive and negative states
of mind in which they suggest that the optimal balance between positive and negative
cognitions is 62% to 38%. This balance allows a healthy, adaptive person to maintain a
predominantly positive state of mind while still being able to focus maximal attention on
negative or threatening events. Negative events and cognitions occupy a significant,
though not the greatest, proportion of their awareness in order to activate coping
strategies to deal effectively with problems, dangers, and threats. The model suggests that
healthy persons will allocate 38% oftheir cognitive and affective resources to the
negative aspects of their environment, and this proportion maintains a homeostatic
balance. Negative events are rendered maximally striking in order to activate adaptive
responses. Negative events, while they loom large, are nevertheless perceived against a
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background of predominantly positive events and perceptions in the healthy person.
Schwartz and Garamoni argue against the idea that healthier people have more positive
cognitions and emotions and that their greater health is characterized by higher
proportions of positivity. They suggest, instead, that the healthy person maintains a 38%
negative state of mind. Depression results when that proportion is exceeded. The
depressed person will have a predominantly negative state of mind with the smaller
proportion being allocated to positive thoughts and feelings. This model suggests that it is
not only the mental recording of negative. and positive events that is important but also
the weight that is given to those events that determines their influence within the
individual.
Martin, Abramson, and Alloy (1984) reported that depressed students tended to
judge their personal control accurately in a positive outcome situation that was not really
under their control. They tended to overestimate the control of another person in the same
situation, however. That is, they saw others as being in control of positive outcomes in
situations that were objectively outside oftheir control; they did not, however, consider
themselves to be in control in similar situations. The judgment of the depressed
participants was accurate and realistic regarding their own control ofthe positive
outcome being offered. Nondepressed participants tended to overestimate their own
control but perceive the other person's control more accurately. These results suggest that
those who are depressed see themselves, accurately, as not in control in situations where
they are truly not in control. However, the accuracy oftheir perceptions may be the
highest under negative circumstances such as feeling no control in positive or favorable
events, although it appears to them that others are in control ofthose positive events.
Alloy and Ahrens (1987) found that depressed participants were more pessimistic
than nondepressed participants in predicting hypothetical future successes and failures in
their lives. Both groups predicted more successes than failures for themselves, but the
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depressed participants were more pessimistic in their overall forecasts for the future. The
nondepressed participants tended to have a self-enhancing bias since they overestimated
their probability of successes and underestimated their probability of failures relative to
hypothetical others who are similar to themselves. The authors concluded that the
depressed were more pessimistic than the nondepressed, but also more realistic since they
I

foresaw their futures as being similar to those of others like themselves. The
nondepressed group was more optimistic but demonstrated a self-enhancing bias in that
they foresaw their futures as brighter than those of others like themselves.
In a fascinating demonstration of why it is valuable to include a measure of
objective reality, Dunning and Story (1991) collected predictions for the future academic
year from depressed and nondepressed college students. They found no difference
between the groups in predicting positive events, but the depressed were much more
likely to predict that undesirable events would occur in their futures. Although the
depressed were more pessimistic in predicting negative events, an examination of the
actual events that occurred after the predictions were made indicated they had still been
overly optimistic. Depressed participants experienced fewer positive and more aversive
outcomes than even they had anticipated. In short, the depressed were not pessimistic
enough; and, as a result, the depressed were much less accurate than their nondepressed
peers. The authors write, "Paradoxically, depressed subjects exhibited more unrealistic
optimism than nondepressed respondents" (p. 527). An examination of actual events that
followed the prediction phase of the study revealed that the depressed participants were
less accurate than the nondepressed when they made optimistic predictions such as ideas
that a mvorable event would happen to them or an unfavorable event would not happen.
The depressed group showed less accuracy when they predicted a positive event would
occur. They were also less accurate when they predicted an undesirable event would not
occur even though they predicted more undesirable events than the nondepressed group
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did to begin with. The authors conclude the depressive realism hypothesis was not
supported. They also speculate that depression may negatively influence future outcomes
even more than it seems to influence, negatively, predictions of the future. Possibly the
depressed lack the emotional, motivational, or social resources needed to attain the
positive outcomes they desire.
In a review article, Ackermann and DeRubeis (1991) found that there were 19
studies that support the notion that the depressed are more realistic than the
nondepressed. However, there are 14 published articles with findings inconsistent with
the depression-realism hypothesis. They suggest that the depressed tended to be more
accurate and evenhanded in those studies involving contingency judgments or self-other
judgments. That is, the depressed seemed to judge their level of control more accurately
than the nondepressed when contingencies that were actually outside of their control
made up the experimental tasks. Likewise, the depressed made more "realistic" and
evenhanded judgments when estimating the likelihood of positive and negative events
occurring in the future in their own lives compared with the lives of other people.
However, the nondepressed seemed to be more accurate in those studies involving the
recall of evaluative, self-referential feedback.

Overly Positive Bias By the Nondepressed

A number of studies have found that the depressed do not distort in a negative
direction. In fact, the depressed participants in these studies saw reality more accurately
than the nondepressed participants who demonstrated a bias in an overly positive
direction. The Nelson and Craighead (1977) study already mentioned found the
nondepressed participants were able to filter out or disregard low levels of negative
feedback and were aware of the higher level of positive feedback. The nondepressed
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seemed unaware of the negative feedback that was actually present in their environment
while the depressed accurately perceived it. This suggests a selective attention bias
among the nondepressed that shifts (or distorts) reality in a more positive direction than is
totally accurate. This was certainly demonstrated in multiple studies previously
mentioned in which nondepressed subjects developed illusions of control in games of
I

chance.
Rizley (1978) found that depressed participants rated internal factors such as
ability and effort as more important causes of negative events but as less important
causes of positive events. The nondepressed participants demonstrated the opposite
tendency, rating internal causal factors as important in their successes (positive events).
The author refers to this as a "self-serving" bias on the part ofthe nondepressed
participants. Some writers have suggested that mastery and competence are basic human
needs; and, when a person attributes successes to personal effort, yet believes that failure
is due to external circumstances, the person is motivated by the need for mastery through
environmental control. Liu and Steele (1986) concluded, however, that when a person is
deprived of control, the attributional analysis that takes place is motivated by the desire to
protect the self-image rather than to regain environmental control. The self-serving bias
seems to function more to protect self-esteem than to regain environmental control
through mastery and competence.
A number of studies have evaluated how the depressed and nondepressed view
the future (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Cocker, Alloy, & Kayne, 1988). Nondepressed
individuals tended to believe that positive events were more likely to happen to them than
to others, but negative events were less likely to happen to them than to others. The
authors refer to this as a self-enhancing cognitive bias or illusion. The depressed
participants did not show this tendency to predict more positive and less negative future
events for themselves compared with others, suggesting they had a more balanced,
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evenhanded or statistically accurate view of the future. The authors ofthe studies believe
nondepressed people show an unrealistic optimism about their own futures. The
depressed are also more likely to predict successes than failures in their own futures, but
they do not enhance their predicted futures compared with the futures they predict for
others. Taylor and Brown (1988) write, "Because not everyone's future can be rosier than
their peers', the extreme optimism that individuals display appears to be illusory" (p.
197). The mildly depressed as well as those with low self-esteem seemed to maintain a
more balanced view of their future prospects compared with the prospects of others,
suggesting their perspective is more accurate. The nondepressed, however, entertain an
overly optimistic distortion, according to the authors, because they expect more positive
events in their futures than in the futures of other people. There is a danger, however, in
drawing research conclusions regarding what is realistic and accurate without any
independent and objective measure of that reality. As the Dunning and Story (1991) study
demonstrated, it may seem as though the depressed are overly pessimistic in forecasting
their futures, but actual events showed them to be overly optimistic. It remains to be
demonstrated whether or not the nondepressed overestimate the positives in their futures
by actually measuring the positive events that occur and comparing those with the
predictions that are thought to be unrealistically positive.
Taylor and Brown (1988) point out evidence that suggests nondepressed
individuals have a positive view of themselves and tend to judge positive traits as more
characteristic ofthemselves than are negative traits. They also suggest that normal people
often perceive themselves as having improved on abilities that are important to them even
when their performance has remained the same. In addition, nondepressed participants
judge positive traits, abilities and attributes to be more characteristic ofthemselves than
ofthe "average person." It seems that the nondepressed display a certain hubris with
regard to their own traits and abilities. Because it is not logically possible for most people
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to be better than average, Taylor and Brown add this to the evidence of a positive, or selfenhancing bias that is characteristic of the nondepressed. Because the depressed
demonstrate less of this bias, they are more realistic in their judgments and perceptions,
according to Taylor and Brown.
Dunning" Meyerowitz, and Holzberg (1989) point out that students, when given
broad ambiguous traits on which to rate themselves, tend to apply idiosyncratic
defmitions which do have personal application. They also demonstrated the fact that
when traits were more specifically defmed, there was no tendency to overapply the trait
labels in a self-serving way. This may help to explain why normal participants seem to
have an overly positive bias, but it does not help us understand why there is a difference
on this dimension between normals and the depressed.
A naturalistic study of homeowners living in an area devastated by brushfires
(Parker, Brewer, & Spencer, 1980, as cited in Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998),
found that many homeowners stayed behind to put water on their roofs as the fire
approached. Water on the roofwas not effective in preventing the destruction of the
homes by fire, and some homes were destroyed while others were spared. Those whose
homes were not destroyed attributed more control to their actions and had significantly
higher perceptions of control over avoiding future frre damage compared with those who
lost their homes. The experience of failing to save their homes reduced the illusion of
control while the success experience of having one's home spared increased the illusion
of control. Depression or its absence were not directly assessed in this study. The
naturalistic observation, however, suggests that failure feedback may be a key variable
that helps produce accurate judgment in negative situations by removing illusions of
control that lead to overly optimistic judgments. It may also be that depressed people
have more experience with failure in therr lives or are more predisposed to perceive
failure, leading to higher rates of accurate judgment in negatively-toned situations.
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Matute (1995) studied failure feedback as the critical variable that affects the
illusion of control or its opposite, learned helplessness. She points out that the
experiments that demonstrated learned helplessness with humans provided the
participants with failure feedback when their responses were ineffective. That is, when
the participant's responses failed to terminate a loud, unpleasant noise, the participant
was fully aware of the ineffectiveness of the response because the noise continued. In
addition, when the noise did stop, the yoked participants (who were in the helpless
condition) were informed that their responses were not correct and the noise terminated
independently of any actions on their part (failure feedback). Matute's study
demonstrated the fact that learned helplessness occurs only when failure feedback is
provided. When failure feedback is not provided, the participants develop the illusion of
control. Thus, exactly the same situation can lead to learned helplessness or the illusion
of control depending upon the availability of failure feedback to the participants. It may
be that experience with failure results in a person's being more aware of negative
feedback and less alert for positive or success-oriented feedback. This may be
particularly true when failure involves strongly aversive consequences, and avoidance
behavior is prevented or is unsuccessful.
Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994) believe the evidence for positive illusions in the
nondepressed is so strong that it is an important component of mental health and
psychological well-being. They suggest that a substantial amount of research documents
the prevalence of healthy, adaptive illusions in normal human cognition. Their analysis of
the literature consistently fmds that the nondepressed possess an unrealistically positive
view of the self, an exaggerated perception of personal control and an unrealistic
optimism. With regard to illusions of control among the nondepressed, they observe that
people often act as ifthey have control in situations that are determined by chance. This
illusion, according to Taylor and Brown, provides a sense of personal control that is

Realism or Distortion

19

integral to positive self-esteem. The depressed are less vulnerable to the illusion of
control and also have lower levels of self-esteem. Taylor and Brown recommend that
therapists foster positive illusions in their patients who are depressed so they can more
closely approximate normal, healthy attitudes and functioning. Distortions in a positive
direction are

sug~ested

as healthy although accurate perception of reality results in

depression, according to these authors.
Alloy and Clements (1992) experimentally tested the protective value of positive
illusions. They applied a negative stressor, in the form of problems that were impossible
to solve, to those who showed positive illusions as well as to those who did not. This was
done in a laboratory setting ,and following the stressor, the participants' level of
dysphoria was measured. They also followed the participants for a month after the
laboratory segment of the experiment and measured their reactions to naturally occurring
negative events in their lives outside of the lab. Their results suggest that those who show
a greater illusion of control are less likely to show immediate negative mood effects
following a fuilure experience in the lab. They are also less likely to show increases in
depressive symptoms one month later after negative events have occurred in their lives.
The authors conclude that positive illusions of control seem to provide some protection
from depressive symptoms following a failure experience or following negative life
events. The absence of positive illusions was a significant predictor of depressive
symptoms, but the effect size was very small as this variable explained only 3-4% ofthe
variance in depressive symptoms.
Colvin and Block (1994; Block & Colvin, 1994) argue against Taylor and
Brown's contention that positive illusions foster mental health. They suggest that it is far
from proven that positive illusions are characteristic of the mentally healthy or that these
illusions promote health. They disagree with the conclusions of Taylor and Brown and
urge researchers to include valid and objective criteria in their studies to determine the
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existence of illusion or distortion. Colvin and Block believe external criteria for reality
can and should be included in research designed to aid in the determination of what is
realistic and what is illusion.

Negative Distortions Among the Depressed

Many studies compare the depressed with the nondepressed and fmd those with
depression are more negative in their thoughts, perceptions, and predictions than those
without depression. Similarly, those without depression tend to have greater optimism
compared with the depressed participants. Many ofthose same studies, however, imply,
but are not able to actually judge, which group is more accurate, correct, or closer to the
truth. Distortions suggest a departure from the true and accurate and should not be
implied without some measure of realistic judgments to compare with the "negative" or
''positive'' judgments ofthe participants. A study by Zarantonello, Johnson, and Petzel
(1979) employed a task that could be measured for accuracy. They studied the accuracy
of student judgment on a problem solving task. Participant groups were sorted according
to D-scale scores on the MMPI. The experimenters were attempting to identify the
conditions under which depressed persons might have distorted cognitions. No significant
differences were found in the actual performance ofthe high-depressive and the lowdepressive groups on anagram solving tasks. However, the high-depressive group gave
lower and more inaccurate estimates of how many anagrams they correctly solved under
certain conditions. The high-depressives thought they did more poorly than they actually
did when a difficult task (6-letter anagrams instead of 4-letter) was combined with high
ego involvement. (They were told the task was an intelligence test and that their teachers
would be given the results). The two groups did not differ when the task was easy (4letter anagrams), nor when it was difficult but carried no ego involvement pressures. The
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high-depressives showed some negative distortion that was not realistically accurate
(underestimating their success in problem solving) but only under conditions which
involved difficulty and ego involvement together. Their actual performance, however,
was not significantly lower than the nondepressed.
A number
, of researchers have demonstrated the fact that the depressed do show
actual deficits in memory (Hartel & Hardin, 1990) and problem solving (Conway &
Giannopolous, 1993). There is also some evidence to suggest that problem solving ability
is an effective moderator for depression (Nezu, Kalmar, Ronan, & Clavijo, 1986). That
is, effective problem solvers are less likely to become depressed even if they have a
depressive attributional style. Teasdale (1983) did not deal with deficits in performance
but pointed out that clinically depressed patients access negative and unpleasant
memories more rapidly than positive memories. This tendency is more pronounced as
depression becomes more profound. He concludes that there is a negative bias in the
cognitions, especially in memories, that are available to people when in a depressed state.
Experiments using the Stroop color-naming task showed that depressed
participants showed increased latencies for negative self-descriptive words (Segal,
Germar, Truchon, Guirguis, & Horowitz, 1995). Powell and Hemsley (1984) used a
tachistoscope to expose depressed and control participants to unpleasant and neutral
words. Recognition thresholds were individually calibrated at a 50% level for all
participants. Depressed participants showed a tendency (p = .08) toward higher
recognition of unpleasant words rather than of neutral words. Depressed persons also
showed greater accuracy or selectivity for the negative and unpleasant stimuli. In a sense,
the depressed participants showed inaccuracy of perception because their awareness of
the unpleasant was disproportionately high although the pleasant was equally available to
them.
Lobitz and Post (1979) found the performance of depressed participants on a digit
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symbol task similar to the performance ofthe nondepressed group although the depressed
had lower levels of self-expectation and lower levels of self-evaluation on the task. In a
related study (Alloy, Abramson, Murry, Whitehouse, & Hogan, 1997), participants at
high cognitive risk for depression demonstrated greater cognitive processing of negative
self-referent information and less processing of positive self-referent information. Thus,
information processing of negative self-descriptions was more involved and active among
those at high risk of depression; but their attention to positive self-descriptions was less.

Social Feedback and Self-Evaluation

A number of researchers have studied the differences between the performances
the depressed and the nondepressed in social situations as well as their perceptions and
evaluations of their social skills. Results in the area of social performance and selfevaluation have been complex and unclear. One study that employed an independent
"objective" criterion for reality measurement investigated self-ratings and observerratings of social competence in depressed patients, in psychiatric control patients, and in
normal control participants (Lewensohn, Mischel, Chaplain, & Barton, 1980). The
depressed participants rated themselves as less socially competent than the two control
groups, and the objective observers agreed. The depressed group was accurate in their
self-perceptions compared with the observer-ratings; the controls, however, perceived
themselves more positively than others saw them. The authors concluded that the lower
self-ratings ofthe depressed participants were not a distortion, as would be predicted by
cognitive theory, since they had seen themselves similarly to the way they were seen by
observers. Instead, the control groups displayed the distorted perceptions by rating
themselves more positively than observers rated them on positive attributes. The selfperceptions of depressed participants were less discrepant from observer ratings than
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were the self-perceptions of both the psychiatric and normal controls.
Campbell and Fehr (1990), however, altered the experimental procedure and
arrived at different conclusions. They noted that observers generally rate participants less
positively than do interaction partners. They also suggested that observer ratings are
overly harsh. Depressed people, who tend to be harsh on themselves, appear to be rating
themselves accurately when compared with observer ratings because observers are also
harsh. In the Campbell and Fehr study, low self-esteem participants viewed themselves
less positively and believed their interaction partners would also view them less
positively. In fact, the interaction partners did not differ in their ratings of low and high
self-esteem participants. Overall, the low self-esteem group was less accurate (compared
with a partner-rating measure) because they underestimated the positivity oftheir
partners' ratings. Thus, comparisons with observer-ratings tend to confirm depressive
realism while comparisons with interaction-partner-ratings do not.
Colvin and Block (1994) argue that neither the depressed nor the well-adjusted
were shown to be either more realistic or more accurate in their self-descriptions. The
Lewensohn et al. (1980) study seemed to suggest that depressed participants were more
accurate in their self-perceptions because their ratings of social competence more closely
matched the ratings of observers; nondepressed group, however, overrated themselves
compared with observer ratings. Colvin and Block point out, however, that the observers
were told that they would be watching the interpersonal behavior of depressed
individuals. They were not advised that two thirds of the participants they would be
watching were not depressed. This may have biased the raters causing an overall
lowering of their ratings; the result may have been that the depressed seemed to have
accurate self-perceptions, but the nondepressed seemed to inflate their self-perceptions.
This conjecture is supported by the fact that the observers, on average, rated all three
groups as below average in social competence. Likewise, participants in all three groups
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(including the depressed) rated themselves higher than the observers rated them.
Gotlib and Robinson (1982) shed an entirely different light on the matter by
suggesting that the depressed are not distorting their social reality in a negative way.
They are actually experiencing and helping to create a negative reality for themselves.
The interaction partners of depressed participants were found to smile less, to exhibit less
arousal and pleasantness in their facial expressions, and to discuss less positive and more
negative content in conversation. They also made fewer statements of direct support to
their depressed partners. Although the interaction partners did not rate their depressed
partners lower than did' their nondepressed partners, they did treat them differently in
conversation. The authors suggest depressives elicit negative behaviors from others in
their environment. Their more negative cognitions, then, would be an accurate reflection
of the reality they help to shape. This is not dissimilar from fmdings that suggest
marriage partners are most committed to spouses who confIrm their self-view, even when
it is a negative self-view (Swann, Hixon, & De La Ronde, 1997). Here, also, is evidence
that depression and negative self-conceptions become self-fulfIlling so that negative
distortions become increasingly confIrmed and increasingly accurate within the depressed
person's environment.
Joiner, Alfano, and Metalsky (1992) conducted research on Coyne's interpersonal
theory of depression (Coyne, 1976). In Coyne's formulation, the mildly depressed person
seeks reassurance that others truly care about him. When reassurance is provided, it is
reinforcing; and the depressed person increases reassurance-seeking behavior to obtain
more of the reinforcement. This eventually leads to rejection which increases the
depressive symptomatology. Joiner, Alfano, and Metalsky studied college students and
their roommates. They found that depression was, indeed, associated with a tendency
toward excessive reassurance seeking. When men (but not women) combined depression
and low self-esteem with high reassurance-seeking, they were signifIcantly more likely to
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be rejected by their roommates. The depressed men with low self-esteem who did not
seek reassurance were not rejected, but were found to be more likable by their
roommates. Thus, for at least a subset ofthe depressed, social rejection is a reality rather
than a distorted cognition.
Children with clear and long-standing depressive episodes evaluated themselves
f

more negatively than did their nondepressed counterparts (Kendall, Stark, & Adam,
1990). Their teachers, acting as objective raters, did not rate the depressed children as
significantly different from their nondepressed peers on measures of ability and
performance. If the teachers' ratings can be considered a measure of objective reality, the
depressed children demonstrated negative cognitive distortions in their self-evaluations.
In another study of social skills perceptions, depressed psychiatric inpatients
expressed more dissatisfaction with their social performance than did control participants
when they watched a videotape of themselves interacting with an age-matched stranger of
the opposite sex (Gotlib, 1982). They also obtained lower ratings on social skill
performance from objective raters suggesting that social skill deficits may be an integral
part of depression. However, nondepressed inpatients showed the same level of social
skill deficit, so it did not appear to be specific to depression in this study. When the social
skill ratings were statistically controlled, the depressed group showed a significant deficit
in self-satisfaction with their social performance. Neither was self-reward nor selfpunishment the direct result of accurate performance appraisal for this group of depressed
patients. The authors discussed treatments options which might target both social skill
improvements and improved accuracy of depressed patients' self-evaluations. Dykman,
Horowitz, Abramson, and Usher (1991) confirmed the fact that both negative cognitive
distortions and actual social skill deficits were involved in the performance of depressed
participants when they interacted with others.
Gotlib (1983) found depressed patients perceived social feedback as more
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negative than it actually was. Both their perception and their recall of the social feedback
were inaccurate in a negative direction compared with the actual feedback delivered.
Siegel and Alloy (1990) investigated the social impact of depression on the
depressed person's nondepressed college roommate. They found that depressed men
received negative evaluations and emotional reactions from their roommates. The
depressed men also accurately perceived these negative reactions. That is, they did not
negatively or positively distort their understanding of their roommates' reactions to them.
Rather, depressed men accurately and correctly rated the social responses of their
roommates to them. Depressed women, on the other hand, felt their roommates evaluated
them more negatively than the roommates actually did. The roommates of depressed
women did not evaluate them any more negatively than did the roommates of
nondepressed women. In short, depressed men received negative social evaluations and
perceived them. Depressed women received normal social evaluations and perceived
their social impact to be more negative than it actually was. Nondepressed participants
had an overly positive view about how their depressed roommates felt about them. This
mixed combination of results demonstrates evidence of depressive realism (depressed
men), self-enhancing positive distortions (nondepressed men and women), and negative
distortions (depressed women).

Attributional Style as a Causal Factor in Depression

Peterson and Seligman (1984) have developed a dimensional theory suggesting
that individuals who understand and explain negative events in terms of the dimensions
of internal, stable, and global causes are prone to develop depression when negative
events occur. Peterson (1992) also suggests that causal explanations for good events are
independent of causal explanations for bad events. It is the internal, stable, and global
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attributions that people use to explain and understand negative events that lead to
depressed affect. Attributions for positive events are independent; but people with a
pessimistic attributional style often tend to explain positive events in external, unstable,
and specific ways. This diathesis-stress model posits internal, stable, and global
attributions as th~ cognitive style that predisposes an individual to become depressed
when faced with negative events. This cognitive style is considered to be pessimistic
because the individual with this style attributes negative events to causes that are his own
fault (internal), that will remain present for a long time (stable), and that affect many
situations and events (global).
There are a number of studies which suggest that a depression-prone attributional
style precedes the onset of depression and predicts depressive affect in response to
negative events (Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 1982; Metalsky,
Halverstadt, & Abramson, 1987; Peterson & Seligman, 1984). In one study, students
were asked to specify the test grade that they would consider to be low and unacceptable.
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) was used to measure their explanatory style.
When test grades were distributed, explanatory style for bad events proved to be an
effective predictor of increases in depressed mood for those students who received low
grades (but not for students who received high grades). Seligman interprets the data to
support the notion that explanatory style can predict depression in response to negative
events. A study of prisoners found that explanatory style prior to imprisonment was an
effective predictor of depressive symptoms at the end of imprisonment. Likewise, in a
study of breast cancer in women, those who explained their cancer in terms of behavior
(internal, unstable, and specific causes) were more likely to believe they were cancer free
after a mastectomy. They were also more likely to be nondepressed. However, those
women who explained their cancer in terms of personality (internal, stable, and global
causes) tended to believe they were not cancer free after surgery; and they were more
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likely to be depressed. According to the authors, these studies support the notion that a
depressive explanatory style precedes and predicts the onset of depression. They believe
that attributions contribute to depression and playa causal role.
DeRubeis et aL (1990) studied the treatment of depression and found that changes
in attributions from pessimistic to optimistic during cognitive therapy mediated
improvement in the depressed participants. Those who showed improvements in their
attributional style from the beginning to the middle of therapy also showed improvements
in their depression from the middle to the. end oftherapy.
There is also some evidence that an optimistic cognitive style correlates with
success in a number of areas. Seligman and Schulman (1986) studied a population of
insurance sales people and found that those with optimistic attributional styles sold 37%
more insurance in their first two years on the job when compared with those who had a
pessimistic attributional style. The optimistic group also tended to remain on the job at
twice the rate of the more pessimistic sales people. In a related finding, optimistic
students performed better in a computer programming course than those with a
pessimistic style (Henry, Martinko, & Pierce, 1993). Of course, these data are
correlational and cannot determine whether optimism leads to success or whether success
leads to optimism.
Longitudinal research by Lewensohn, Steinmetz, Larson, and Franklin (1981)
casts doubt on the idea that cognitive style or distortion precedes and predicts depression.
A prospective design was used to study a large community sample of 998 people over the
course of one year to determine if depression-related cognitions were causally related to
depression. A variety of depression-related cognitive measures were employed. A total of
63 (6%) of the 998 participants were depressed at the time of the initial assessment and
85 (8.5%) had become depressed by the time of the one-year follow-up. Only 10% of
those diagnosed as depressed were in treatment during the study. Depressed persons in
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the sample did show higher expectancies for negative events and lower expectancies for
positive events. In addition, they displayed irrational beliefs and low self-esteem
compared with nondepressed participants. Participants who became depressed during the
course of the study did not differ, however, from controls on the cognitive measures
taken before the onset of their depression. That is, prior to becoming depressed, the
I

participants did not subscribe to irrational beliefs. They had no lower expectations for
positive outcomes nor higher expectations for negative outcomes. They did not tend to
attribute success to external causes nor attribute failure to internal causes, and they did
not perceive themselves as having diminished control. People who had a history of
depression prior to the study did not differ from never-depressed controls on the
cognitive measures. The authors conclude that depression-related cognitions did not
precede nor predict a depressive episode, nor did depressive-cognitions remain after the
remission of the depression. This is a fmding replicated by a number of researchers
(Blackburn, Jones, & Lewin, 1987; Dohr, Rush, & Bernstein, 1989; Lewensohn,
Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981). While depressive-cognitions did not predict
depression, they did affect recovery from an episode of depression. Depressed
participants with more negative cognitions were significantly less likely to improve.
Cognitive distortions were not related to the etio logy of depression in this large
community sample because they seemed to emerge concomitantly with the episode of
depression. The authors remark:
People who are vulnerable to depression are not characterized by stable patterns
of negative thinking of the type postulated by the cognitive theorists. Apparently
people change their expectancies and subscribe to irrational beliefs as a result of
being depressed, and these cognitive changes reverse themselves as the individual
recovers. (p. 218)
There are a variety of studies that demonstrate sometimes confusing and
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conflicting conclusions. Berndt, Berndt, and Kaiser (1982), for instance, did not [md
,

attributional style was useful in predicting depression in college students. Handal, Gist,
and Wiener (1987), however, found attributional style was correlated with depression
scores for male college students but not for female students. Weinberger and Cash (1982)
studied rejection for a date as an experimental situation; this was an attempt to investigate
a personally meaningful situation as well as an interpersonal situation. Following their
rejection, (all participants were rejected) the participants uniformly expressed more
depressive affect. Their attributional style before this negative event did not, however,
predict their depressive affect after the event. A number of studies have demonstrated a
correlation between dysfunctional attitudes or depressive attributional style or both and
depressed affect, but the depressive cognitive style disappears when the depressive
symptoms abate (Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Hollon, Kendall, & Lumry, 1986;
Persons & Rao, 1985; Simons, Garfield, & Murphy, 1984). In these studies there seems
to be similar improvement in cognitive style whether cognitive therapy is employed or
whether cognitions are ignored and medication alone is employed to bring about
improvement in depressive symptoms. Such results cast doubt on the notion than
cognitions cause and maintain depression and suggest instead that negative or
dysfunctional cognitions are but a symptom of depression that tend to remit as affect
improves.
Because the evidence on attributional style is somewhat contradictory, Sweeney,
Anderson, and Bailey (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of the relationship between
attributional style and depression. They reviewed 104 studies involving nearly 15,000
participants. Their results suggested that for negative events, internal, stable, and global
attributions had a reliable and significant association with depressed affect. Attributions
of external, unstable, and specific causes for positive events also had a relationship with
depression across studies, although this was a weaker relationship than that for negative
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events and depression. The relationship between attributions and depression was
consistent for both college populations and psychiatric populations.
A number of researchers believe that dysfunctional attitudes or pessimistic
attributions are mood-dependent and manifest only when a person is actually in a
depressed mood (Miranda & Persons, 1988; Miranda, Persons, & Byers, 1990; Peselow,
I

Robins, Block, Barouche, & Fieve, 1990).

In one study, dysfunctional attitudes improved

both with successful treatment by medication and successful placebo treatment. Miranda,
Persons, and Byers (1990) propose that dysfunctional beliefs are vulnerability factors for
depression even though their research suggests that dysfunctional beliefs increase with a
depressed mood and decrease as the mood improves. Their conclusion seems to be that
dysfunctional beliefs are present but dormant and not detectable in nondepressed people.
When depression occurs, the dysfunctional beliefs emerge and are reported. It is hard to
conclude, however, that beliefs are a vulnerability factor and a precursor of depression if
they are neither present nor detectable before the occurrence of depression.

The Role a/Self-Efficacy in Depression

Albert Bandura (1997), of Stanford University, explicated a theOlY of selfefficacy which he described as a social cognitive theory. The theory demonstrates a
strong cognitive element by virtue of Bandura' s suggestion that what people believe
influences their motivations, emotions, and actions much more than objective reality
influences their motivations, emotions, or actions. He focuses his primary interest in
peoples' beliefs about their own self-efficacy. Bandura explains that if people do not
believe they can effectively do something, they have little motivation or incentive to act.
Similarly, if they have the belief that they can effectively do something, they wi11 persist
and persevere in the face of repeated failures. Bandura's theory posits the fact that
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efficacy beliefs are the central basis of human behavior, because without efficacy beliefs,
there is little or no motivation for action.
Bandura (1997) uses the word agency to refer to acts that are done intentionally.
He explains that self-efficacy involves the judgments people make with regard to their
ability to perform certain actions. People will perform certain intentional actions when
and if they judge themselves capable of performing those actions effectively. Without a
sense of efficacy, people are unlikely to engage in the acts they believe themselves
incapable of performing. If people believe they have no power to perform certain actions
successfully or to attain certain results, they will not attempt to make those things happen.
Peoples' beliefs in their efficacy affect virtually everything they do, think, or feel.
Depression involves perceived inefficacy to perform those actions necessary to
obtain desired goals, to produce personal satisfaction, or to alter unpleasant life
circumstances. The perceived inability to obtain what one longs for leads to depression.
For instance, students who believe they cannot manage scholastic demands or form
meaningful relationships are prone to develop depressive symptoms. Bandura (1997)
believes in reciprocal influences which can produce spiraling causality, When people
perceive themselves to be ineffective, they can develop a depressed mood. The depressed
mood, in turn, lowers their efficacy, leading to still lower perceptions of self-efficacy, A
low sense of self-efficacy to attempt to accomplish those things in life that will lead to
satisfaction and a feeling of self-worth leads to depression. Likewise, depression
diminishes peoples' effectiveness and lowers still further their sense of self-efficacy.
Bandura suggests that depression derives from a variety of sources, including
unreasonably high self-expectations, lack of social skill, negatively biased cognitive
processing, and even the inability to suppress depressing ruminations. He suggests,
however, that a sense of personal inefficacy is a central, common factor among all the
subtypes of depression.
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Bandura proposes a triadic reciprocal causation model. The three primary
elements of causation in this model include behavior, internal personal factors such as
thoughts and feelings, and external environmental factors. The three elements interact in
ways that produce reciprocal influences. For instance, the environment clearly influences
human behavior; but it is also true that humans influence and alter their environments.
The influence between behavior and environment is bi-directional and reciprocal. This is
how Bandura explains the reciprocal influence of mood and cognition mentioned earlier.
A low sense of self-efficacy is a personal element which can alter the behavioral element.
For instance, a student who believes he stands no chance of passing the [mal exam in a
course may alter his behavior by failing to study for the exam. This lack of studybehavior is likely to lead to a poor exam grade which reciprocally influences and further
lowers the student's sense of self-efficacy with regard to academic performance.
Bandura believes that depressed people tend to misperceive their own
accomplishments and failures. They also tend to alter their recollections oftheir own
performances in a negative direction. A depressed mood can alter judgments made while
in that mood. In experiments in which mood was altered experimentally (Forges, Bower,
& Moylan, 1990; Salovey & Bimbaun, 1989; as cited in Bandura, 1997), an induced

positive mood improved perceived self-efficacy in the participants, but an induced
despondent mood decreased perceptions of self-efficacy. Judgements about self-efficacy
seem to be an important cognitive factor that both influence depressive mood states and
are, in turn, influenced by depressive mood states.

Gender Effect

Participants have not been shown to differ based upon the variable of gender
when comparing depressed with nondepressed participants in studies on judgments,
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perceptions, or predictions of various criteria variables. Gotlib (1982) did not fmd gender
,

a significant variable when depressed psychiatric inpatients and nondepressed hospital
employees judged their own social competence during dyadic interactions with agematched, opposite-sex strangers. Nor did Siegel and Alloy (1990) fmd gender a
discriminating variable when studying social judgment and social perception among
college students. Alloy and Clements (1992) found support for the illusion of control
among the nondepressed both in real-life as well as laboratory experiments when
negative events and failure experiences took place. However, the gender ofthe
participants did not bias or affect any of the independent or dependent variables.
Similarly, no gender effect was found in experiments that compared depressed with
nondepressed participants in problem solving (Nezu, Kalmar, Roman, & Clavijo, 1986)
or predictions of positive and negative events in their own futures (Alloy & Ahrens,
1987; Dunning & Story, 1991). Alloy and Abramson (1979) reported a series of four
experiments with multiple comparisons. There was no gender effect in most of those
statistical comparisons. However, they did fmd that nondepressed females significantly
overestimated their degree of control in the 75-25 contingency condition when compared
with nondepressed males. In addition, females tended to be less certain of their judgments
of control than males during the 50% contingency trials. Tang and Critelli (1990) used an
experimental design very similar to that of Alloy and Abramson and found that
judgments of contingency were not influenced by gender. The preponderance of
exper.imental evidence suggests there is no gender effect that influences results when
comparing depressed with nondepressed participants whether they are college students or
clinic patients.
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Self-Report Instruments

Self-report instruments were used in this study to assess a variety of symptomrelated variables. Self-report instruments have been extremely useful in aiding
psychological and personality assessment. They tend to be brief and easily administered
I

to patients, helping clinicians to gather a great deal of information in a short period of
time. In addition, the patient can fill out the forms, which saves the clinician time. More
of the clinician's time can then be devoted to treatment and intervention rather than to
data collection through lengthy interviews with each patient. Also, scores on self-report
inventories can be compared with normative data, adding an objective measure to the
subjective impressions of the clinician. Over time, repeated administrations of self-report
inventories can provide data-points that help track progress in treatment.
In spite of their many advantages, self-report inventories do have some
limitations. One such limitation is that they do not provide accurate diagnostic
information on the presence or absence of mental illness. That is, a self-report inventory
is not a substitute for a diagnostic assessment by a clinician. For instance, the most
widely used personality assessment tool is the MMPI (Graham, 1990). When Hathaway
and McKinley first published the MMPI in 1943, they hoped it would serve as a selfreport diagnostic tool The clinical scales were designed to match the major diagnostic
groups of the time. The MMPI proved to be a very valuable means of gathering
information on personality characteristics. It was not, however, useful in assigning
clinical diagnoses to patients. Normal people, for example, often obtained high scores on
one or more of the clinical scales. Patients in any particular diagnostic group often
obtained high scores on the corresponding MMPI clinical scale. However, those patients
often obtained high scores on other clinical scales, as welL The result is that the clinical
scales do not seem to be pure measures of the symptom dimensions suggested by the
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scale names (Graham, 1990). For that reason, most psychologists refer to the clinical
,

scales by their number rather than the scale name, to avoid confusing a personality
pattern with a clinical diagnosis.
The same limitation applies to the self-report instruments that were employed in
this research project. For instance, the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) has a number of
symptom subscales; but its strength lies in the fact that it is a measure of overall mental
and emotional distress (Derogatis & Savitz, 2000). There is some controversy as to
whether the BSI measures separate dimensions with its subscales or measures a single
dimension of psychological distress with its global index score (GSI). A number of
authors, however, have reported that factor analysis ofthe BSI indicates it is most
informative as a measure of general psychological distress that may derive from any
number oflife stress issues or diagnostic categories (Boulet & Boss, 1991; Piersma,
Boes, Reaume, 1994).
One of the values of self-report instruments is that they can be used to measure
symptom-change over time. This makes them useful in measuring symptom responses to
various treatments in groups of patients. It is also true, however, that self-report
instruments tend to measure the "state" ofthe symptoms at a particular time rather than
measuring whether or not a person qualifies to receive a specific diagnosis. The Beck
Anxiety Inventory, for instance, correlates highly with state-measures of anxiety and
seems to measure the current state of anxiety symptoms rather than measuring anxiety as
a trait within an individual (Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995).
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), having a moderate to high correlation with
clinical ratings for psychiatric patients, has been found to detect depression as effectively
as longer and more costly structured interview (Groth-Marnat, 1997). The BDI (Beck,
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) demonstrated concurrent validity with
psychiatric ratings ofthe depth of depression in a college population (Bumberry, Oliver,

Realism or Distortion

37

& McClure, 1978). The BDI-II was revised to be more consonant with the DSM-IV

criteria defming depression. The BDI-II has been established as a valid and reliable
method of identifying depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Groth:-Marnat, 1997). In
a University of Pennsylvania clinical sample, a BDI score of 17 or more has be.en shown
to have a 93% true-positive rate and an 18% false-positive rate for the presence of major
I

depression. Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). Nevertheless, some authors have argued that
BDI scores are very transient and change rapidly over short int~rvals of time (Coyne,
1994; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Bumberry, Oliver, and McClure (1978) found that BDI
scores for college students correlated. 77 with psychiatric ratings made immediately after
taking the BDI. When the psychiatric assessment was conducted from 1 to 14 days after
the BDI score had been obtained, however, the correlation between the two dropped to
.30. Coyne (1994) argues that self-report instruments are not an adequate substitute for a
more complete assessment ofthe criteria for a diagnosis of depression. He points out that
research using self-report instruments with college students is analog research, and
researchers must be cautious when applying conclusions drawn from such research to
populations of clinically depressed patients.
Past research also suggests that the use of self-report instruments is safe and
harmless for the students participating in research projects. Quite a number of research
projects have involved the administration of a psychological questionnaire or
questionnaires just before students take an exam in school. None ofthese research
projects have reported any adverse effects from this procedure (Folkman & Lazarus,
1985; Lay, Edwards, Parker, & Endler, 1989; Phillips & Endler, 1982; Scherer,
Drumheller, & Owen, 1992).
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Gathering the Clues Together

Overall it is not clear that the cognitive therapy premise which holds that
depression is based upon negative cognitive distortions of reality is correct. In fact, there
is evidence that suggests the depressed are more accurate in th~ir perception and
judgment, but the nondepressed have illusions of control, have a self-serving bias, or a
self-enhancing bias. There is also some indication that neither the depressed nor the
nondepressed are accurate in their judgments because both groups tend to overestimate
their control, their social skill performance, or the positive events likely to occur in their
futures. It may be that distortion varies based upon other factors such as failure feedback,
the level of reward or ego involvement related to a task. The majority ofthe research'
points to the depressed having more awareness of negative events such as lack of control
or of unfavorable social feedback, but it is unclear whether or not this awareness is
accurate or is exaggerated in a negative way. Thus, it is difficult be sure if the depressed
are accurate in their perceptions or if they are distorting in a negative way. Likewise, it is
uncertain if the nondepressed are seeing events accurately and realistically or if they have
a tendency to distort in a positive direction. There is also research to suggest that the
depressed are negative, and that this is an accurate reflection of their experience and their
environment; however, the nondepressed are similarly positive about the more positive
lives they lead. It may be that depression is an accurate assessment of a negative reality,
and the nondepressed have more positive or more fortunate lives.
It is clear that research studying the cognitive distortions of the depressed and

nondepressed must incorporate some independent measure of accuracy of judgment by
the groups. We can make conclusions about the relative negativity of the opinions ofthe
depressed by simply comparing them to the nondepressed, but to determine whether
those negative opinions are accurate or distorted we need some criteria from which to
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draw factual conclusions about accuracy and distortion. In addition, facts can be
determined to be accurate or inaccurate but are neither positive nor negative in and of
themselves. People can be correct or incorrect in predicting or perceiving factual data.
The values implied by the labels positive and negative, however, are added when we
exercise our ability to give meaning to our experience. Therefore, research on cognitive
I

distortion must be careful to distinguish accuracy of judgment from the positive or
negative evaluations ofthose judgments. The depressed and nQndepressed should be
compared with regard to the accuracy of their judgment and also with regard to the
meaning they attach to those judgments.
It is also important for research to measure cognitive judgments and evaluations

with regard to something that has relevance and meaning in the lives of the participants.
The groundbreaking work done by Alloy and Abramson (1979) on depressive realism
measured the participants' perceptions of control with regard to a light bulb turning on or
off. Such a task makes an excellent experiment but has little relevance or importance in
the actual lives ofthe participants.
This research project measured the predictions of students with regard to their
own performance on an academic examination. The focus on exam performance
highlights possible distortions regarding the self, which is one of the three components of
Beck's cognitive triad of depression (Beck, 1967; Beck, 1996; Beck, Rush, Shaw, &
Emery, 1979). Also, an exam is a task that has relevance to each student's life, having a
potential reward value to each of them. Likewise, students were asked to predict and
evaluate their own performances on a task that contributed to their own successes or
failures in their academic careers. Each student was asked to predict a matter of fact for
which the accuracy ofthe prediction could be measured. The factual correctness of each
prediction was checked after the exams were graded in order to gauge whether or not
depression or its absence correlated with distorted estimates in either a positive or
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negative direction. Before the exam, the students knew how much they had studied and
,

how well prepared they felt for the test. They had not yet seen the exam questions,
however, and some uncertainty was introduced by this fact. Such ambiguity may have
permitted more or less distortion, if distortion were to take place. After the exam, the
students had a greater knowledge of what they knew compared with what they were
asked to produce on the test. That condition created a slightly different environment in
which to distort or predict accurately. The study was not designed to evaluate whether
nondepressed students do better on exams than depressed students (though this was
assessed). The data being sought were more closely related to whether or not depressed
students had negative cognitions relative to their actual performance regardless of
whether that performance was good or bad. Likewise, the data indicated whether or Iiot
nondepressed students had positive illusions relative to their actual performance
regardless of whether that performance was good or bad.
The current study tested a number of hypotheses including:
Depressed students, when compared with nondepressed students, negatively
distort their perceptions of reality by predicting poorer scores on an examination than
they actually earn. The null version of this hypothesis is that depressed students do not
differ from nondepressed students in the accuracy of their predictions of how they will
score on an examination.
A second hypothesis is that depressed students evaluate the exam grades they
actually earn in a more negative way, as demonstrated by a lower satisfaction, than
nondepressed students who earn similar grades. The null version of this hypothesis is that
depressed and nondepressed students do not differ in the satisfaction they report when
receiving similar grades on an examination. There are a number of sub-hypotheses
related to this overall hypothesis including:
Depressed students with high exam grades are less satisfied with their grades than
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nondepressed students with high exam grades.
Depressed students with above average exam grades are less satisfied with their
grades than nondepressed students with above average exam grades.
Nondepressed students with average exam grades are more satisfied wjth their
grades than depressed students with average exam grades.
.

I

Nondepressed students with low exam grades are more satisfied with their grades
than depressed students with low exam grades.
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Method

Participants

Participants were college and graduate students at a state university in Central
Pennsylvania. The students were tested during four consecutive semesters of the 2001
and 2002 academic years (fall, spring, summer, and fall semesters). If a professor agreed
to have his or her class participate in the project, the students in that class were invited to
participate voluntarily in the project. A total of five professors allowed their classes to
take part in the research.
A total of357 students (77 males and 280 females) from a rural state university
served as participants in this research project. The participant population ranged in age
from 17 to 55 with 84.2% of them falling between the ages of 18 and 22 (see Table 1). A
total of318 of the participants were college students and 39 ofthem were graduate
students at the university (see Table 2). In terms of marital status, 332 (93%) ofthe
participants were single and had never been married, 21 (5.9%) were married, and 4
(1.1 %) were divorced (see Table 3). The racial and ethnic composition ofthe participant
popUlation is listed in Table 4. Participants were predominantly Caucasian (90.8%) with
9.2% falling into a minority category.
All of the participants were taking a psychology class when they took part in the
research project. Their academic major varied, however, and students from 31 different
academic majors participated (see Table 5). The largest group of participants were
psychology majors who represented 51.3% ofthe total pool. Students who had not
declared a major represented 10.1 % of the study population. The remaining 138
participants represented 30 academic majors at the college or graduate leveL The mean
time participants reported studying for their final examination was 5.6 hours (SD = 3.89).
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The mean fmal exam score among all 357 participants was 65% (SD = 17.58).

Table 1
Ages of Participants
Age

Frequency

Percent

17

1

0.3

18

39

10.9

19

74

20.7

20

91

25.5

21

63

17.6

22

34

9.5

23

13

3.6

24

12

3.4

25

3

0.8

26

3

0.8

27

3

0.8

28

4

1.1

29

1

0.3

31

1

0.3

32

2

0.6

33

1

0.3

35

1

0.3

36

1

0.3

37

1

0.3

39

1

0.3

40

2

0.6
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2

0.6

46

1

0.3

49

1

0.3

50

1

0.3

Table 2
Academic Year In School of Participants .
Academic Year In School

._ _Frequency

Percent

1st year of co lIege

70

19.6

2nd year of college

92

25.8

3rd year of college

96

26.9

4th year of college

49

13.7

5th year of college

11

3.1

1st year of graduate school

31

8.7

2nd year of graduate school

6

1.7

3rd year of graduate school

2

0.6

Table 3
Marital Status of Participants
~M=a~n~'ta~l~S~ta~t~u~s________~ _____~F~r~e~q=ue~n~c~y______~P~e~em

Single

332

93.0

Married

21

5.9

Divo-=...rc=e,-"d:...-_ _~._._ _._ _ _4-'--_ _ _ _ _ _ _""-1.=1
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Measures

Just prior to taking their fmal exams at the end of the semester, all students
completed five psychological questionnaires. The Beck Depression Inventory-:Second
Edition (BDI-I1) was the first of those instruments (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The
I

BDI-I1 is a 21-item self-report inventory for measuring the presence and severity of
depression in adults and adolescents. Item content covers areas which include sadness,

Table 4
Racial and Ethnic Composition of the Participant Population
RaciallEthnic Group

Frequency

Percent

Caucasian

324

90.8

African-American

17

4.8

Hispanic

11

3.1

Asian

2

0.6

Native American

1

0.3

Multiracial

2

0.6

loss of pleasure, guilt, suicidal thoughts, agitation, indecisiveness, loss of energy, and
changes in sleep and appetite. The participants answer questions within the time frame of
the previous two weeks in order to be consistent with criteria for Major Depressive
Disorder as discussed in the DSM-IV-TR. The questionnaire takes between 5 and 10
minutes to complete. Each of the 21 items is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 to 3.
The minimum possible score is 0 and the maximum possible score is 63. The authors
have categorized scores in the range of 0 to 13 as minimally depressed, 14 to 19 as mildly
depressed, 20 to 28 as moderately depressed, and 29 to 63 as severely depressed. The
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Table 5
Academic Majors of Participants
Major

Frequency

Percent

Psychology

183

51.3

Undeclared

36

10.1

Elementary Education

33

9.2

Communication

16

4.5

Music Education

13

3.1

Biology

9

2.5

Business Administration

9

2.5

Special Education

7

2.0

Socio logy/Criminology

6

1.7

Math

6

1.7

Art

6

1.7

Social Work

5

1.4

English

3

0.8

Technical Education

3

0.8

Secondary Education

3

0.8

Commercial Art

2

0.6

Meteorology

2

0.6

Counseling

2

0.6

History

2

0.6

Philosophy

2

0.6

Sociology

1

0.3

Nursing

1

0.3

Respiratory Therapy

1

0.3
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Gerontology

1

0.3

Guidance Counseling

1

0.3

Geography

1

0.3

Early Childhood Ed

1

0.3

Occupational Safety
,

1

0.3

Economics

1

0.3

International Studies

1

0.3
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BDI (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) demonstrated concurrent
validity with psychiatric ratings of the depth of depression in a college population
(Bumberry, Oliver, & McClure, 1978). The BDI-II was revised to be more consonant
with the DSM-IV criteria defming depression. The BDI-II has been established as a valid
and reliable method of identifYing depression (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; GrothMamat, 1997). A cutting score of 17 was used to distinguish the depressed group from
the nondepressed. This score has been shown to have a 93% true-positive rate and an
18% mIse-positive rate for the presence of major depression in the University of
Pennsylvania clinical sample (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).
The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) was administered to obtain a global measure
of distress and to obtain scores in a variety of symptom areas other than depression. The
BSI is a 53-item self-report symptom inventory for measuring the presence and severity
ofa variety of psycho logical symptoms in adults and adolescents (Derogatis, 1993). Each
ofthe 53 items is rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).
When scored and profiled the BSI provides ratings in nine primary symptom dimensions
and three global indices of distress. The primary symptom areas include somatization,
obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic
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anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. Global indices include global severity
index (GSl), positive symptom total (PST), and positive symptom distress index (PSDl).
The questionnaire takes between 8 and 10 minutes to complete. Test participants answer
the questions with reference to the time frame of the most recent seven days. The BSI
depression scale has been shown to correlate highly (r

.79,p < .001) with the Center for

Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) (Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1981) and
moderately (r = .50) with the MMPI depression scale (Boulet & Boss, 1991). Derogatis
and Melisaratos (1983) have reported internal consistency Alpha coefficients for all nine
symptom dimensions ranging from a low of 0.71 for psychoticism to a high of 0.85 for
depression, suggesting acceptable reliability for the subscales. Test-retest reliability over
a 2-week period ranged from a low of 0.68 for somatization to a high of 0.91 for phobic
anxiety (Derogatis & Savitz, 2000). Moderate convergent validity with MMPI scales has
been demonstrated for the BSI dimensions (Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983). The BSI has
been normed for college students (Cochran & Hale, 1985).
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) was administered to check for possible
confounding effects of anxiety in the depressed participants. The BAI is a 21-item selfreport inventory for measuring the presence and severity of anxiety in adults and
adolescents (Beck & Steer, 1993). The questionnaire takes between 5 and 10 minutes to
complete. Each ofthe 21 items is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 3
(severely; I could barely stand it). Fourteen ofthe BAI items represent somatic aspects of
anxiety and the remaining seven items deal with subjective feelings of fear and anxiety.
Test participants answer the questions within the time frame of the previous seven days.
The authors have categorized scores in the range of 0 to 7 as minimal anxiety, 8 to 15 as
mild anxiety, 16 to 25 as moderate anxiety, and 26 to 63 as severe anxiety. Reliability
and internal consistency are quite high (Cronback coefficient alpha> .90); test-retest
reliability is moderate to high with correlations of .60 to .75, and there is moderate to
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high convergent validity with other instruments that measure anxiety (r > .50).
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The BAI

was designed to measure symptoms of anxiety which are minimally shared with those of
depression so as to distinguish anxiety from depression as much as possible. It performs
this discrimination better than most measures of anxiety (Creamer, Foran, &

~ell,

1995;

Fydrich, DowdalL & Chambless, 1992; Siegert, Walkey, & Taylor, 1992). Moderate
I

discriminant validity (r < .65) has been reported between the BAI and self-reported and
clinically-rated depression in both psychiatric patients and nonpsychiatric participants
(Steer & Beck, 1997). Nevertheless, significant correlations between the BAI and the
BDI have been reported that range from a low of.48 to a high of .61. Correlations above
.60 are typically found between instruments that measure anxiety and those that measure
depression, and the BAI and BDI correlations often fall below that level. Steer and Beck
(1997) suggest that approximately 20% of what the BAI is measuring reflects unique
aspects of anxiety that are not attributable to depression or to an overall dysphoric affect.
Hewitt and Norton (1993) support the notion that the BAI and the BDI effectively
measure the separate but overlapping constructs of anxiety and depression.
The Test Anxiety Scale (TAS) was administered to check for the possible
confounding effects of anxiety related to the pending examination. The TAS is a 37-item,
true/false, self-report inventory (Sarason, 1978). The T AS yields a score that reflects the
intensity ofthe internal feeling of anxiety associated with taking tests and examinations.
The TAS is based upon a trait-model oftest anxiety and measures general anxiety about
testing situations. On a scale of 0 to 37, scores ranging from 0 to 18 represent low test
anxiety and scores ranging from 19 to 37 represent high test anxiety. Clark, Fox, and
Schneider (1998) found the T AS to be a valid measure oftest anxiety among college
students. There is evidence to suggest that depressed, but not test-anxious participants,
have the depressive pattern of attributions for positive and negative events. The same
authors suggest that depressed and test-anxious participants have different attributional
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styles (Ingram, Kendall, Smith, Donnell, & Ronan, 1987).
The Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) was administered to investigate
differences in the attributions between the depressed and nondepressed groups (Peterson,
et aI., 1982). The Questionnaire poses 12 hypothetical events and asks the respondents to
imagine themselves in those situations and to rate the causes ofthe hypothetical events.
There are six good and six bad events listed. The respondents rate the causes ofthe
events on 7 -point scales along the dimensions of internal versus external causes, stable
versus unstable causes, and global versus specific causes. Separate subscales are derived
for internality, stability, and globality for both good and bad events. Overall composite
scores can be obtained for positive attributions (attributions for good events) and negative
attributions (attributions for bad events). Sweeney, Anderson,.and Bailey (1986) reported
internal consistency alpha ratings of. 73 for the composite score for negative events and
.69 for the composite score for positive events. The ASQ is not easily faked even by
participants offered a reward to answer in the most optimistic manner, nor by participants
coached on what the test measures (Schulman, Seligman, & Amsterdam, 1987). The
reformulated learned helplessness model of depression suggests that a depression-prone
attributional style involving internal, stable, and global attributions for negative events
leads to depression when negative life events occur, The ASQ is the leading measure of
attributional style. Research has demonstrated a high correlation between
internaVstable/globalattributional style for negative events and depressive symptoms
among both college students and psychiatric patients (Eschen & Glenwick, 1990;
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey,
1986). In fact, a depressive attributional style has been found to explain 48% ofthe
variance on depression measures such as the Beck Depression Inventory (Higgens,
Zumbo, & Hay, 1999).
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Procedures

Professors in the psychology department of the university were approached by
phone and bye-mail to inquire if they would be willing to allow their classes tp
participate in the research project. A face-to-face meeting was arranged with those
I

professors who showed an interest in participating. The research project was explained in
detail at those meetings. Each professor was advised that the students in their classes who
agreed to participate would spend approximately one hour of class time completing the
psychological instruments during the class immediately prior to the semester [mal exam.
Then, during the class when the final exam was actually administered, the students would
be asked to answer four brief questions on paper. Five of the university professors agreed
to allow their classes to participate in the project.
The responsible investigator attended the last class prior to the [mal examination
for those classes in which the professors were willing to allow the research to be
conducted. The researcher read a description of the research project (see Appendix A) to
the entire class. The voluntary nature of each student's participation was emphasized in
the project description. Students who did not wish to participate were advised that they
could leave class if they did not wish to participate, and that the remainder of the class
would be occupied with the completion of the research measures and questionnaires. No
student elected to leave class in order not to participate. No student who elected to
participate ever dropped out at any later stage of the project.
The informed consent form (see Appendix B) was then distributed and read aloud
to the students by the researcher. All students were asked to sign the informed consent
form before participating in the project. Participation was completely voluntary and no
coercion was employed. Any student who did not wish to participate was perfectly free to
make that choice. The informed consent form explained the purpose of the research, the
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expectations of the students if they decided to participate, and any potential risks or
benefits of the project. The form also explained that all individual test scores would be
kept confidential and shared only with those academic advisors directly involved in the
research. The form explained that written results of the research would include aggregate
data only and would not identify any participant individually. '
All students were then asked to complete a form listing some information about
themselves including name, address, gender, age, race, marital status, current year in
school, academic major, and current overall grade point average (see Appendix C).
Students were then asked to complete five psychological questionnaires which
would take from 33 to 55 minutes of their time to complete. The questionnaires were
administered in the same order for all participants. That order was:
Beck Depression Inventory-II
Brief Symptom Inventory
Beck Anxiety Inventory
Test Anxiety Scale
Attributional Style Questionnaire
The students were advised that the instructions for each questionnaire were at the top of
each form. They were given the first questionnaire and advised that they could work at
their own pace while completing the forms. When they fmished the first ofthe
questionnaires they were told to bring them to the front of the room and exchange them
for the second. As they fmished each ofthe questionnaires, they turned them in and were
given the next until they had completed all five. The students were free to go when they
completed all five of the psychological questionnaires.
Immediately prior to taking the fmal exam for the course, the students were asked
to write down the amount of time they spent studying for the exam. They were also asked
to predict the grade (as a percentage) that they expected to obtain on the exam. This
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question was posed on paper to the students as follows:
Please write down the percentage score you believe you will earn on the exam
you are about to take. Your estimate will not be shown to the course instructor or to
anyone at the university.
Following the exam and before they left the examination room, students were
I

asked to estimate the grade (as a percentage) that they believed they obtained on the
examination they had just completed. This question was posed on paper to the students as
follows:
Please write down the percentage score you believe you earned on the exam you
just completed. Your estimate will not be shown to the course instructor or to anyone at
the university.
When the exam was scored, the responsible investigator told each student his or
her score. Each student was then asked to rate the grade he or she received either as
Highly Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Somewhat Unsatisfactory, or
Highly Unsatisfactory. As with the previous questions, this assessment was posed to each
student with a promise not to show the satisfaction levels to any university personnel.
Whereas the previous questions required each participant to make an estimate related to a
numerical (but as yet unknown) piece of data, this question them to make a value
judgment regarding a lmown piece of data. Taken together, the questions called for
accuracy or distortion with regard to matters of fact and for evaluations on the qualitative
meaning ofthose facts. Some students, for instance, may have obtained an 85% and
found that highly satisfactory while others may have found an 85% to be unsatisfactory.
The investigator scored the psychological questionnaires and contacted students
who reported "dangerous symptoms" on the questionnaires; this was done by mail within
one week oftheir fmal exam. Dangerous symptoms were operationally defmed to
include:
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The following answers on question number nine in the BDI-II:

1. I have thoughts of suicide but I would not carry them out.
2. I would like to kill myself
3. I would kill myself if I had the chance.
Answers on the BSI of "a little bit", "moderately", "quite a bit", or "extremely"
to:
Question 9 -- Thoughts of ending your life
Question 40 -- Having urges to beat, injure, or hann someone
BDI-II depression score in the severe range (29 to 63)
Any students who gave the responses listed above received a letter in the mail from the
investigator informing them of their answers which had raised concerns, reminding them
oftheir opportunity to seek professional assistance through the university counseling
center (see Appendix D for example ofletler sent to students).
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Results

Analysis of the data revealed there was a significant negative correlation between
score on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) and actual fmal exam score [r(357)
-.149,p < .01]. Thus, higher levels of depressive symptoms correlated with lower exam

,

scores. Those with lower levels of depressive symptoms tended to obtain better exam
scores.

Group Comparisons

Using a cutting score of 17 on the BDI-II, participants were divided into
two groups. The depressed group (D) was operationally defmed as those who obtained a
score of 17 or greater on the BDI-II while the nondepressed group (ND) was
operationally defmed as those who obtained a score of 16 or less. There were 43 subjects
in the depressed group and 314 in the nondepressed group. The two groups were not
significantly different in terms of gender, X2 (1, N
X2 (2, N= 357)

1.72,p

in school, X2 (7, N = 357)
point average, 1(294)

357) = 1.68,p = .20, marital status,

.43, academic major, X2 (31,N= 357) = 12.60,p = .999, year
5.13, p

1.33,p

.64, age, 1(355) = -1.08, p = .28, (2-tailed), or grade

.18, (2-tailed). There was a significant difference

between the D and ND groups in the variable of race, X2 (5, N= 357) = 18.15,p

.00,

with Caucasians showing higher levels of depressive symptoms. The difference in racial
or ethnic composition of the groups is not surprising since the Epidemiologic Catchment
Area (ECA) study of depression found a lower prevalence of depression among AfricanAmericans and Hispanics than among Caucasians (Kaelber, Moul, & Farmer, 1995). It is
somewhat surprising that the groups are not significantly different in terms of gender
since the ECA study also found a higher prevalence of depression among females than
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among males.
The mean fmal exam score for the D participants was 58% while the mean exam
score for the ND participants was 66%. This difference was significant, t(355)

2.87,p <

.004, (2-tailed), suggesting that depressed participants earn significantly poorer exam
scores than their nondepressed classmates. The central focus of the study, however, was

to investigate differences in predictions of exam scores not differences in actual exam
scores.

Testing the Hypotheses

The differences between predicted and earned exam scores.

The absolute differences between the scores participants predicted that they would
earn before they took the exam, the scores they predicted that they would earn
immediately after they took the exam, and their actual exam scores were calculated (see
Table 6). These absolute differences between predicted scores and actual scores were
then compared for the D and ND groups. The results suggested that there was no
significant difference in the accuracy of the predictions (the absolute difference between
the predicted score and the actual score) made by D and ND participants before they took
the examination, 1(355) = -1.61,p < .11, (2-tailed). Likewise, there was no significant
difference in the accuracy of the predictions made by D and ND participants after they
took the examination, 1(355) = -1. 74, P < .08, (2-tailed).
Because there were so many more nondepressed participants (N = 314) than
depressed participants (N

43), two matched groups of data were developed for analysis.

Depressed participants were matched for actual exam score with nondepressed
participants, creating two groups, each containing 43 participants. This allowed the
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predicted exam scores of depressed and nondepressed participants who earned exactly the
same actual exam scores to be compared. The participants in the D and ND groups in this
matched sample were not significantly different in terms of gender, race, marital status,
year in school, academic major, age, or grade point average. The mean predi~ted exam
scores for the

de~ressed

and nondepressed participants in the matched groups are

presented in Table 7. The mean exam score predictions before they took the exam were
not significantly different for the D and ND groups in the matched samples, t(84) = .924,
p < .36, (2-tailed). The mean exam score predictions after they took the exam were also

not significantly different, t(84)

=

.898, p < .37, (2-tailed).

Table 6
Mean Absolute Differences Between Predicted Exam Scores and Actual Exam Scores
Time of Prediction

Depressed Group

Nondepressed Group

M

SD

M

SD

18.14

12.93

14.82

12.65

14.07

11.46

11.24

9.78

Pre-exam prediction
difference
Post-exam prediction
difference

The mean absolute differences between the scores participants predicted that they
would earn before they took the exam, the scores that they predicted they would earn
after they took the exam, and their actual scores were calculated (see Table 8). Those
absolute differences between predicted scores and actual scores were then compared for
the D and ND groups. The results suggest there was no significant difference in the
accuracy of the predictions (the absolute difference between the predicted score and the
actual score) made by the D and ND participants before they took the examination, t(84)
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.028,p < .98, (2-tailed). The results also suggest there was no significant difference in

the accuracy ofthe predictions made by the D and ND participants after they took the
examination, t(84)

=

-.132, p < .90, (2-tailed).

An analysis was conducted to determine if the BDI-II score (as a continuous
variable) was correlated with exam score predictions made before the exam and after the
exam. There was no significant correlation between BDI-II score and exam score
predictions made before taking the exam [r(86) = -.152,p > .05] or after taking the exam
[r(86) = -.147, p > .05]. These results suggest that higher BDI-II scores did not

significantly correlate with lower predicted exam scores. Likewise, lower BDI-II scores
did not significantly correlate with higher predicted exam scores. In addition, fewer
reported symptoms of depression, as reported on the BDI-II, did not significantly
correlate with the abso lute difference between the predicted exam score and the actual
exam score for predictions made before the exam [r(86)
exam [r(86)

=

=

-.066,p > .05] or after the

-.071, p > .05]. That is, depressive symptom level did not seem to correlate

with the accuracy of the participants' predictions of their exam scores.

Table 7
Mean Exam Scores Predicted by Participants in Matched Sample
Time of Prediction

Depressed Group

Nondepressed Group

M

SD

M

SD

Pre-exam prediction

72%

11.18

75%

13.35

Post-exam prediction

68%

12.55

70%

13.24
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Table 8
Mean Absolute Differences Between Predicted Exam Scores and Actual Exam Scores for
the Matched Samples
Time of Prediction

Depressed Group

Nondepressed Group

M

SD

M

SD

18.14

12.93

18.22

13.72

14.07

11.46

13.76

10.57

Pre-exam prediction
difference
Post-exam prediction
difference

The direction ofpredictions of exam scores.

The hypothesis being investigated was that increased depressive symptoms would
influence the accuracy of a participant's exam score prediction in a negative direction.
Therefore, the directions ofthe inaccurate predictions were analyzed. In the matched
sample, 14 people underpredicted their actual exam scores during their preexam
prediction, while 72 overestimated the exam scores they would earn. It is interesting to
note that 84% ofthe sample overpredicted their exam scores. Table 9 shows the number
of depressed and nondepressed participants who underpredicted their exam scores and
who overpredicted their exam scores. A Chi-square analysis showed no significant
relationship between membership in the depressed group or nondepressed group and the
tendency to underpredict or overpredict the exam scores, X2 (1, N

86)

.341,p < .56.

This suggests that depressed and nondepressed participants are not significantly different
in their tendency either to underpredict their exam scores or to overpredict their exam
scores. A second analysis of the direction of the error of prediction was conducted which
included participants who accurately predicted their exact exam scores in addition to

,
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those who over and under predicted their scores. Only two ofthe nondepressed
,

participants cOlTectly predicted their exact actual exam scores and none of the depressed
participants predicted their correct actual score. A Chi-square analysis again showed no
significant relationship between membership in the depressed or nondepressed group and
the tendency to underpredict, accurately predict, or overpredict actual exam scores, X2 (2,
N= 86)

=

3.39,p < .18.

One interesting fmding when studying the full sample of357 participants was that
amount of study time and the actual exam score did not correlate [r(357)

=

-.061,p > 05].

Table 9
Number of Participants Who Underpredicted and Overpredicted Exam Scores in the
Matched Sample
Direction of Prediction

Depressed Group

Nondepressed Group

U nderprediction

8

6

Overprediction

35

37

The mean amount of study time was 5.6 hours (SD 3.89). This fmding suggests that
increased study time for the exam did not correlate with a higher score on the exam.
Likewise, decreased study time did not correlate with a lower score on the exam.

Levels of satisfaction with exam scores.

Participants were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with their actual exam
score on a 5-point scale (highly satisfied, moderately satisfied, satisfied, somewhat
unsatisfied, highly unsatisfied). One of the hypotheses of the study was that depressed
participants would be less satisfied than nondepressed participants with equivalent exam
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scores. Table 10 displays the number of participants who scored at each percentage level
on the exam. Analysis ofthe data revealed a number of [mdings. Level of satisfaction
increased consistently as exam score increased. For example, participants with exam
scores of less than 40% tended to be highly dissatisfied while participants with scores
between 91 % and 100% tended to be highly satisfied. There was a significant effect for
the level of performance on the exam (the actual exam score) and the level of satisfaction
with the score, F (6,357) = 53.77,p = .000. A univariate analysis of variance posthoc
Scheffe test indicated higher satisfaction with good scores (61 % or more) and lower
satisfaction with poor scores (60% or less) (p = .000). Mood (depressed versus
nondepressed) did not significantly alter satisfaction with exam score level, F (1,357) =

.374, P = .541. That is, the satisfaction levels of depressed participants were similar to the
satisfaction levels ofllondepressed participants across the full range of exam scores.
Likewise, the interaction of the mood variable (D versus ND) and exam score level did
not significantly alter satisfaction, F (5,357) = .373,p = .867. This fmding offers no
support to the notion that depressed participants would be less satisfied than
nondepressed participants who earn similar exam scores.

Predictions related to good exam scores and to poor exam scores.

Another hypothesis that was explored was the possibility that depressed
participants have negative cognitive distortions in a somewhat selective manner. For
example, is it possible that depressed people have negative cognitive distortions when
experiencing positive events but are accurate in their perceptions of negative events? To
investigate this hypothesis, exam scores were divided into "good" scores and "poor"
scores. Scores were considered "good" (positive event) if they were 61% or better and
"poor" (negative event) if they were 60% or less. Two factors were considered in making

Realism or Distortion

62

Table 10
Exam Scores and Numbers of Participants at Each L~vel
"",E"-,x""am~s"",'c~o~re~ran",.-"",g"""e,---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _N",--,-,,,,u.mber

of pruiicipants in that score range

~O%

~

41-50%

46

51-60%

51

61-70%

63

71-80%

80

81-90%

60

this division. The average score for all students on their exams was 65%. More
importantly, the level ofsatisfuction with the exam grade was significantly higher for
those participants who earned 61 % or better when compared with those who earned 60%
or less. Since student satisfaction was significantly higher for scores of61 % or higher,
those scores were considered to be a positive event.
The level of exam score performance (good versus poor) had a significant effect
on exam score predictions made by both depressed and nondepressed participants before
they took their exam. The .mean difference between the predicted exam score and the
actual exam score for nondepressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 25.70

(SD 13.45). The mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam
score for the depressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 25.30 (SD 13.41).
The mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for the
nondepressed participants who did well on the exam was 9.63 (SD 7.84). The mean
difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for the depressed
participants who did well on the exam was 9.90 (SD 5.25). Clearly the students who did
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poorly on the exam had a greater prediction error than those students who did well on the
exam, for predictions made prior to taking the exam. Mood, however, did not influence
the prediction error, F (1, 86) = .001, P = .980. That is, depressed students who did poorly
on the exam tended to have the same level of prediction error as nondepressed students
who did poorly on the exam. Likewise, depressed students who did well on the exam
tended to have the same level of prediction error as nondepressed students who did well
on the exam. The interaction of mood (D versus ND) and exam score level (good versus
poor) also did not influence exam score predictions, F (1, 86)

.020, p

=

.887.

Similar results were obtained for exam score predictions made after taking the
exam. The mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score
for nondepressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 18.70 (SD 11.92). The
mean difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for
depressed participants who did poorly on the exam was 19.54 (SD 12.21). The mean
difference between the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for nondepressed
participants who did well on the exam was 8.08 (SD 4.38). The mean difference between
the predicted exam score and the actual exam score for the depressed participants who
did well on the exam was 7.78 (SD 6.28). Again, the students who did poorly on the
exam had greater levels of prediction error than the students who did well on the exam.
Mood, again, did not influence the prediction error, F (1, 86)

=

.018, p

=

.90. The

interaction of mood (D versus ND) and exam score level (good versus poor) also did not
influence the exam score predictions, F (1, 86) = .077, p = .78.

Interesting correlations that emerged.

The central hypotheses of this study were not supported by the fmdings. It did not
appear that depressed participants ditlered fromnondepressed participants in the
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accuracy oftheir predictions related to their final exam scores. Data on a variety of other
variables that were peripheral to the central hypotheses ofthis study were obtained in the
course of the research. A correlational matrix was calculated for those variables (see
Table 11). These fmdings will be reported as a matter of interest, but must be interpreted
with some caution because calculating multiple correlations on multiple factors will yield
some significant correlations purely by chance. The chances of making a Type I error, or
rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true, increase with the calculation of multiple
correlations.
BDI-II score and attributional style were negatively correlated [r(357)

=

-.318,p

< .01]. This suggests that higher depression scores are correlated with more negative
attributional style. TIllS finding is consistent with the research on attributional style. .
Age and overall grade point average were positively correlated [1'(296)

=

.239,p <

.01]. This correlation suggests that older students tended to have higher grade point
averages. Amount of time spent studying for the final exam also con'elated with age
[r(357) = .154,p < .01]. Taken together these fmdings suggest that older students tend to

spend more tin1e studying for their fmal exams and this tends to be reflected in higher
overall grade point averages.
Overall grade point average and score on the Test Anxiety Scale were negatively
correlated [r(296)

-.203, p < .01J. This fmding suggests that as the level of test anxiety

increases, grade point average decreases. Actual exam score and score on the Test
Anxiety Scale also negatively correlated [r(357)

-.258,p < .01]. In an interesting

fmding, the amount oftin1e spent studying for the final exam and the score on the Test
Anxiety Scale were positively correlated [r(357)

.213,p < .01]. Taken together, these

fmdings suggest that test anxious participants spend more time studying for exams but
obtain poorer exam scores and poorer GPA's than their non-test anxious counterparts.
Higher GP A correlated with higher exam score prediction error for both

Realism or Distorti~n

65

Table 11
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses
Grade Point

BAl

TAS

1.00

.24**

.01

.08

.24**

1.00

-.04

-.20*

BAl

.01

-.04

1.00

.50*'

TAS

-.08

-.20**

.50**

1.00

BSI Somatization

.02

-.05

.72

.36*'

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

-.00

-.10

.61 **

.47*'

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

-.02

-.04

.46**

.38*'

BSI Depression

-.04

-.06

.54**

.40*'

.08

.02

.68**

.43*'

BSI Hostility

.02

-.10

.54**

.33*'

BSI Phobic Anxiety

-.04

.00

.44**

.28*'

BSI Paranoid Ideation

-.00

-.13*

.49**

.38*'

BSI Psychoticism

.07

*.07

.50**

.35*'

BSI Global Severity Index

.03

-.10

.68**

.49*'

BSI Positive Symptom Total

.02

-.09

.67**

.50*'

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

.01

-.09

.62**

.34*'

ASQ

.01

-.02

-.03

-.10

Study time

.15**

-.07

.08

.21 *'

Exam Score

.02

.51 **

-.04

-.26*

Pre-Exam Prediction

.05

.29**

-.10

-.2*~

Post-Exam Prediction

-.00

.28**

-.09

-.23*

Age
Grade Point Average

. BSI Anxiety

*

Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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Table 11
Correlations for Variables SeQarate from theQentratHYQothese~
BSI Somatization

BSI Obsessive

Age

.02

-.00

Grade Point Average

-.05

-.10

BAI

.72**

.61 **

TAS

.36**

047

1.00

049**

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

049**

1.00

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

040**

.58

BSI Depression

043**

.64**

BSI Anxiety

.57**

.62**

BSI Hostility

.51 **

.58

BSI Phobic Anxiety

.39**

044**

BSI Paranoid Ideation

041 **

.58**

BSI Psychoticism

Al **

.59**

BSI Global Severity Index

.64**

.82**

BSI Positive Symptom Total

.64**

.81 **

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

.57**

.68**

ASQ

-.01

-.11 **

Study time

.04

.01

Exam Score

-.05

-.02

Pre-Exam Prediction

-.08

-.15**

Post-Exam Prediction

-.05

-.14**

BSI Somatization

* Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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Table 11
Correlations for Variabl~s Separate from the Central HYnotheses
BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

B SI Depression

Age

-.02

.04

Grade Point Average

-.04

-.06

BAI

.46**

.54**

TAS

.38**

.40**

BSI Somatization

.40**

.43**

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

.58**

.(j4**

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

1.00

.64**

BSI Depression

.64**

1.00

BSI Anxiety

.52**

.56**

BSI Hostility

.52**

.64**

ESI Phobic Anxiety

.51 **

.44**

BSI Paranoid Ideation

.62**

.63**

BSI Psychoticism

.66**

.79**

BSI Global Severity Index

.75**

.80**

EST Positive Symptom Total

.75**

.80**

ESI Positive Symptom Distress

.61 **

.63**

ASQ

-.27**

-.28**

Study time

-.01

.09

Exam Score

-.04

-.04

Pre-Exam Prediction

-.11 *

-.06

Post-Exam Prediction

-.12*

-.09

*

Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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. Table 11
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses
BSI Anxiety

BSI Hostility

BSI Phobic Anxiet)

Age

*08

.02

-.04

Grade Point Average

.02

-.10

.00

BAI

.68**

.54**

.44**

TAS

.43**

.33**

.28**

BSI Somatization

.57**

.51 **

.39**

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

.62**

.58**

.44**

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

.52**

.52**

.51 **

BSI Depression

.56**

.64**

.44**

BSI Anxiety

1.00

.55**

.48**

BSI Hostility

.55**

1.00

.40**

BSI Phobic Anxiety

.48**

.40**

1.00

BSI Paranoid Ideation

.52**

.57**

.41**

BSI Psychoticism

.56**

.58**

.47**

BSI Global Severity Index

.75**

.74**

.56**

BSI Positive Symptom Total

.77**

.74**

.56**

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

.58**

.64**

.51 **

ASQ

-.18**

19**

-.16**

Study time

.15**

.07

.05

Exam Score

.03

-.02

-.03

Pre-Exam Prediction

-.01

-.09

-.01

Post-Exam Prediction

.00

-.01

-.04

* Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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from the Central Hypotheses
BSI Paranoid Ideation

BSI

-~OO

.07

Grade Point Average

-.13*

-.07

BAl

.49**

.50**

TAS

.38**

.35**

BST Somatization

.41 **

.41 **

BST Obsessive Compulsive

.56**

.59**

BST Interpersonal Sensitivity

.62**

.66**

BSI Depression

.63**

.79**

BST Anxiety

.52**

.56**

BSI Hostility

.57**

.58**

BSI Phobic Anxiety

.41 **

.47**

BSI Paranoid Ideation

1.00

.66**

BST Psychoticism

.66**

1.00

BSI Global Severity Index

.73**

.78**

BST Positive Symptom Total

.74**

.77**

BST Positive Symptom Distress

.60**

.65**

ASQ

-.13*

-.28**

Study time

.07

.05

Exam Score

-.08

-.06

Pre-Exam Prediction

-.10

-.08

Post-Exam Prediction

-.08

-.10

Age

* Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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Table 11
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses
Index

BSI Global

BSI Positive

Total

Age

.03

.02

Grade Point Average

-.10

-.09

BAI

.68**

.67**

TAS

.49**

.50**

BSI Somatization

.64**

.64**

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

.82**

.81 **

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

.7S**

.75**

BSI Depression

.80**

.80**

BSI Anxiety

.7S**

.77**

BSI Hostility

.74**

.74**

BSI Phobic Anxiety

.S6**

.56**

BSI Paranoid Ideation

.73**

.74**

BSI Psychoticism

.78**

.77**

BSI Global Severity Index

1.00

.96**

BSI Positive Symptom Total

.96**

LOO

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

.78**

.69**

ASQ

-.26**

-.24**

Study time

.06

.07

Exam Score

-.04

-.03

Pre-Exam Prediction

-.09

-.09

Post-Exam Prediction

-.11 *

-.10

* Significant at .OS level
**Significant at .01 level
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Table 11
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses
BSI Positive

Grade Point Average

Distress
.01

.02

-.09

-.04

RAJ

.62**

TAS

.34**

-.22**

BSI Somatization

.57**

15**

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

.68**

-.24**

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

.61 **

-.72**

BSI Depression

.63**

-.28**

BSI Anxiety

.58**

-.18**

BSI Hostility

.64**

-.19**

BSI Phobic Anxiety

.51 **

-.16**

BSI Paranoid Ideation

.60**

-.13**

BSI Psychoticism

.65**

-.28**

BSI Global Severity Index

.78**

-.26**

BSI Positive Symptom Total

.69**

-.24**

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

1.00

-.21**

-.22**

1.00

Study time

-.01

-.01

Exmn Score

-.10

+.06

Pre-Exam Prediction

-.16**

.02

Post-Exam Prediction

-.14**

.04

ASQ

*

Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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Table 11
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses
Time

Exam Score

.15**

.12

Grade Point Average

-.07

.15**

BAI

.08

-.04

TAS

.21 **

-.26**

BSI Somatization

.04

-.05

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

.01

-.02

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

-.01

-.04

BSI Depression

.09

-.04

BSI Anxiety

.15**

.03

BSI Hostility

.07

-.02

BSI Phobic Anxiety

.05

-.03

BSI Paranoid Ideation

.07

-.08

BSI Psychoticism

.05

-.06

BSI Global Severity Index

.06

-.04

BSI Positive Symptom Total

.07

-.03

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

-.01

-.10

ASQ

-.01

-.06

Study time

1.00

-.06

Exam Score

-.06

1.00

Pre-Exam Prediction

.10

.54**

Post-Exam Prediction

-.00

.70**

Age

*

Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .011evel
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Table 11
Correlations for Variables Separate from the Central Hypotheses
Pre-Exam Prediction

Post-Exam Prediction

.05

-.00

.29**

.28**

BAJ:

-.10

-.09

TAS

-.21 **

-.23**

-.08

-.05

BSI Obsessive Compulsive

-.15**

-.14**

BSI Interpersonal Sensitivity

-.11 *

-.12**

BSI Depression

-.06

-.09

BSI Anxiety

.01

.00

BSI Hostility

-.09

-.01

BSI Phobic Anxiety

-.01

-.04

BSI Paranoid Ideation

-.1 0

-.08

BSI Psychoticism

-.08

-.10

BSI Global Severity Index

-.09

-.11 *

BSI Positive Symptom Total

-.09

-.10

-.16**

-.14**

ASQ

.02

.04

Study time

.10

.00

Exam Score

.54**

.70**

Pre-Exam Prediction

1.00

.74**

Post-Exam Prediction

.74**

1.00

Age
Grade Point Average

BSI Somatization

BSI Positive Symptom Distress

*

Significant at .05 level
**Significant at .01 level
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predictions made before taking the exam [r(357) = .290,p < .01] and after taking the
exam [r(357) = .278,p < .01]. Since the majority of participants tended to ~verestimate
the exam score they would earn, the participants with the higher GPA's tended to
overestimate their exam scores more than did the participants with the lower GPA's.
Interestingly, Test Anxiety Scale scores tended to moderate tpe tendency to overestimate
exam scores. Test anxiety was negatively correlated with prediction error. The higher the
test anxiety, the lower the prediction error for predictions made before the exam [r(357) =
-.213,p < .01] and after taking the exam [r(357)

= -.227,p < .01].

Not surprisingly, exam score and grade point average were correlated [r(357) =

.514,p< .01]. Clinical measures also tended to correlate. The Beck Anxiety Inventory
scores correlated with the Test Anxiety Scale scores [r(357) = .502,p < .01]. Both the
Beck Anxiety Inventory [r(357) = .682, p < .01] and the Test Anxiety Scale [r(357) =
A92,p < .01] correlated with the Global Severity Index of the Brief Symptom Inventory.

A positive attributional style, as measured by the Attributional Style Questionnaire, was
negatively correlated with scores on the Beck Anxiety Scale [r(357)

-.223,p < .01], the

Test Anxiety Scale [r(357) = -.217,p < .01], and the Global Severity Index of the Brief
Symptom Inventory [r(357) = -.263,p < .01].
Marital status, F (2,356) = 1.55,p = .21 for predictions made before the exam
and F (2.356)

1.96,p:;:: .14 for predictions made after the exam, and gender, F (1,

356) = .71,p = 040 for predictions made before the exam and F (1,356) = 1.55,p = .21
for predictions made after taking the exam, did not significantly influence predictive
accuracy. The participant's year in school did influence prediction error for exam score
predictions made before, F(7, 357) = 7.75,p < .00, and after, F(7, 357)

5.27,p < .00,

taking the exam. Posthoc analysis revealed that juniors and seniors in college were much
more likely to predict their exam scores inaccurately than were freshmen (p = .000) and
sophomores (p = .002).
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Discussion

The present study attempts to understand the accuracy of judgments made by
depressed and by nondepressed participants in order to know if negative cognitive
distortions would be characteristic of the depressed participants. One strength of the
study is that it compares the judgments of depressed and of nondepressed participants
using an objective measure of reality (exam score) as the criterion for determining if
cognitions are distorted or accurate. Another strength of the study is that it compares an
estimate of future performance with an estimate of immediate past performance and
compares both estimates with actual measurable performance. In addition, both depressed
and nondepressed participants evaluated their actual performance when they knew what
exam score they had earned. This step in the research allows us to see if depressed
participants negatively distort their evaluations of their performance regardless of
whether or not they distort their estimate oftheir performance. The task being evaluated
was one which had personal meaning in the lives of the participants. Unlike experiments
in which participants are asked to solve anagrams or estimate their control of a light bulb
turning on or off, these participants were asked to predict and evaluate their performance
on a task which was relevant to their success or failure in school. Such a task has
implications for a participant's self-assessment of personal qualities such as competence,
intelligence, and effort.
The results ofthis study do not support the notion that depressed students have
negative cognitive distortions of reality when compared with nondepressed students.
Both depressed and nondepressed students tended to overestimate the scores they would
earn on a college or graduate school final exam, and the two groups were not
significantly different in their predictions ofthe scores they would earn.
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The differences between predicted and earned exam scores.

A number of different approaches to the data were carried out. The absolute
differences between the exam scores that participants predicted they would earn and the
exam scores they actually earned were calculated and compared for the depressed and the
nondepressed participants. There was no significant difference between the depressed and
the nondepressed groups in this measure of their predictiv(f accuracy.
Because there were so many more nondepressed participants (N=314) in the full
sample than depressed participants (N=43), there was some concern that a true difference
between the groups might be masked by the preponderance of nondepressed participants
in the pool. Therefore, matched groups of depressed and nondepressed participants were
created, each containing 43 participants. Using this matched-sample data, the absolute
differences between the exam scores participants predicted that they would earn and the
exam scores that they actually earned were calculated and compared for the depressed
and nondepressed groups. There was no significant difference between the depressed and
the nondepressed groups in this measure of their predictive accuracy.
The analysis ofthe absolute difference data for both the full sample and the
matched-group sample suggests that there is no difference between depressed and
nondepressed students in the accuracy of their exam score predictions. Neither group
showed themselves to be more accurate or less accurate because the accuracy of their
predictions was so similar. In other words, the depressed participants did not distort in an
overly negative way compared with the nondepressed. Likewise, the nondepressed did
not distort in an overly positive way compared with the depressed. Inaccuracy of
prediction, which can also be thought of as distortion, was similar for both groups; and
both groups tended to be highly overly optimistic in predicting the exam scores they
expected.
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The BDI-II score itself (without using the score to divide participants into
depressed and nondepressed groups) was analyzed along with exam score predictions
made both before and after taking the examination. There was no significant correlation
between BDI-II score and exam score predictions made either before or after taking the
examination. This result suggests that higher BDI-II scores, which represent higher levels
of depressive symptoms, do not significantly correlate with lower predicted exam scores.
The more depressed participants did not seem to distort realit)l by expecting to obtain
lower exam scores. Likewise, the less depressed participants did not seem to distort
reality by predicting higher exam scores. Nor did The BDI-II score, viewed as a
continuous variable, correlate with the absolute difference between the predicted exam
score and the actual exam score. Thus, depressive symptom level did not correlate with
absolute difference scores as a measure of predictive accuracy.

The direction ofpredictions of exam scores.

Because cognitive distortions may influence not only the direction of predictive
inaccuracy, but also the amount of predictive inaccuracy, the direction of the participants'
predictive inaccuracies was also analyzed. For example. cognitive theory not only
suggests that depressed participants will make inaccurate predictions but also that their
inaccuracies will be in a negative direction. Statistical analysis showed no difference
between depressed and nondepressed participants in their tendencies to underpredict,
overpredict or accurately predict their exam scores. The majority of participants in both
groups tended to overestimate the scores they would obtain on the final examination, and
neither the depressed nor the nondepressed participants were significantly different in this
tendency to overestimate.
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Predictions related to good exam scores and to poor exam scores.

Because depressed participants may be selective in their cognitive distortions, the
data were analyzed to see if depressed participants were more accurate in their cognitions
of negative events but negatively distorted their cognitions when experiencing more
positive events. A positive event, for the purposes of this study, was operationally defined
as better performance on the exam as reflected by a higher exam score, although a
negative event was similarly defmed as poorer perfonnance on the exam as reflected by a
lower exam score. The results clearly indicated that the prediction made by depressed and
nondepressed participants were very similar whether the participants scored well or
poorly on the exam. Thus, depressed participants did not make more accurate predictions
than their nondepressed counterparts when negative events occurred and poor exam
scores were earned. Likewise, depressed participants did not make more negative
predictions than their nondepressed counterparts when positive events occurred such as
scoring well on the exam.

Levels of satisfaction with exam scores.

Another level of investigation sought to learn if depressed participants evaluated
their perfonnance more negatively than nondepressed participants. Participants were
asked to rate their level of satisfaction with their actual exam score on a 5-point scale
(highly satisfied, moderately satisfied, satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied, highly
unsatisfied). Depressed and nondepressed participants did not differ in their satisfaction
ratings. Participants in both groups tended to be more satisfied with higher exam scores
and less satisfied with lower exam scores.
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Some implications of the findings.

The results of this study suggest that depressed and nondepressed participants do
not differ significantly in the accuracy oftheir predictions oftheir exam scores, in the
positive or negative direction of their predictions, or in their evaluations of their exam
performances. Neither do they differ in their predictions oftheir scores whether their
scores are high or low. The results of this study were robustly nonsignificant and support
the notion that those with depressive symptoms are no different than those without
depressive symptoms in their tendency to distort cognitively with regard to predictions of
their performance on an examination or evaluations or their performance on the same
examination. The idea that negative cognitive distortion is a fundamental factor in
depression was not supported by the results ofthis research. Neither was the notion
supported by this research that those with depression are significantly more accurate in
their cognitions about their exam performance (depressive realism). The results of this
study suggest that those who are depressed are no more accurate than those who are not
depressed. Tn fact, the depressed and nondepressed participants were more alike than
different in their exam score predictions and in their level of satisfaction with their exam
performance. Likewise, the self-efficacy of those with more depressive symptoms, as
measured by their predictions of their exam scores, was no different than the self-efficacy
ofthose with fewer depressive symptoms.
This study supports the notion that depressed students are no more negative in
their expectations, predictions, or evaluations of their exam performance than those who
are not depressed. An additional finding included the fact that negative attributional style
and depressed scores on the BDT-II were correlated. Since the literature suggests that
those who are depressed are more negative in their thinking and in their attributional
style, it is possible that the depressed are actually experiencing a more negative reality

Realism or Distortion

80

than those who are not depressed; therefore, their negative cognitions are an accurate
I

reflection oftheir more negative life circumstances. Coyne and Gotlib (1983) have
criticized cognitive theorists for suggesting that depression is the result of negative
cognitive distortions of reality. They maintain that depression is the result of negative and
unpleasant life circumstances, not the result of cognitive distortions about life. Coyne and
Gotlib argue that depression is more closely related to environmental antecedents and
consequences and is not determined by cognitive distortions. They agree that depressed
persons evaluate themselves and their performances more negatively but they do not
believe those negative evaluations are distortions.
There are treatment implications to the fmding that depressed participants do not
distort their cognitions in a negative direction. Cognitive-behavioral therapists often ask
depressed patients in psychotherapy to do small "experiments" to test whether their
negative thoughts are accurate or not. The therapists expect that patients who collect
actual "data" with regard to their negative conclusions will fmd that things are much
more positive than they believed. This therapist expectation is based upon the assumption
that patients are distorting reality in a negative direction, thus drawing conclusions based
upon that negative bias. If, however, depressed patients are accurate in their thinking,
empirical treatment approaches will serve only to reinforce their negative views as having
been correct in the fIrst place. If depressed patients are accurate in their negative
perceptions of themselves and their relationships, treatment approaches that focus on
problem solving and skill building would be more valuable than altering negative
cognitions. For example, if a depressed patient believes that he is unpopular, it makes a
big difference whether or not he is correct. If the patient is quite popular and simply does
not realize it, the best approach would be to help the patient perceive and understand the
evidence he is missing that confIrms his popularity. If, however, the patient really is
unpopular, he would benefIt more from social skills training than from cognitive
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restructuring. Social skills training would help him improve his social standing and
actually become more popular.

Interesting correlations that emerged.

The results of this study revealed a significant negative correlation between scores
on the BDI-II with scores on the fmal exam. Thus, higher levels of depressive symptoms
correlated with lower exam scores, and lower levels of depressive symptoms correlated
with higher exam scores. However, the negative correlation of -.149 explains only 2% of
the variance. That is, knowing the BDI-II score allows us to predict about only 2% ofthe
variance in the exam score. The mean exam score for depressed participants was 58%,
which was below the mean for the entire sample of 65%. The mean exam score for
nondepressed participants was 66%, or slightly higher than the mean for the entire group.
There was a significant difference between the mean exam scores of the depressed and
nondepressed participants, suggesting that depressed participants did significantly more
poorly on the exam. In terms of exam grades, the average depressed student earned an
"F" on the exam while the average nondepressed student earned a "D". This can be the
difference between passing and failing. This fmding is consistent with our knowledge of
depression. We expect depression to have a negative effect on academic performance
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). A number of researchers have suggested
possible explanations for the lower academic performance of depressed participants. A
study by Ellis, Varner, Becker, and Ottaway (as cited in Hunt & Ellis, 1999) pointed out
that being in a sad mood affects the ability of college students to activate and use prior
knowledge. Likewise, Hertel and Hardin (1990) found a correlation between depression
and deficits in memory while Conway and Giannopolous (1993) found an association
between depression and deficits in problem solving. Clearly, depression is associated
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with certain deficits in cognitive performance though negative cognitive distortions may
not be among those deficits.
Some interesting results emerged which were not related to the central focus of
the study. Some caution must be exercised in giving weight to these results since
calculating multiple correlations can lead to some significant correlations emerging
merely by chance. One surprising fmding was that the amount of time spent studying for
the exam and the score earned on the exam were not correlated. One would expect to find
that increasing amounts of study led to increasingly better scores on the exam. This was
not the case in this research project, however. In part, the explanation may relate to test
anxiety. Those who scored highly on test anxiety also scored higher on study time. This
suggests that increased levels oftest anxiety led to increased effOrts in study and
preparation for the exam. Those study efforts did not, however, appear to bear fruit.
Exam score and test anxiety score were negatively correlated, suggesting that increased
test anxiety resulted in increased study time but in lower exam scores. Test anxiety was
also negatively correlated with overall grade point average. Although test anxious
participants appear to spend time studying, it does not lead to improved exam scores or
higher grade point averages. The literature on test anxiety explains that test anxious
participants tend to focus on distracting thoughts about their own performance fears
during an examination rather than focusing on the task at hand. This self-preoccupation
shifts their attention away from the material they have studied and contributes to their
poorer performance on the test (King, Mietz, Tinney, & Ollendick, 1995; Sarason, 1984;
Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986; Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1990).
Thus, it seems that test anxiety is a moderator variable that plays a role in the relationship
between amount of study time and success on an examination. There may be other
moderator variables, as well, which were not examined in this project.
Higher grade point average correlated with higher exam score prediction error fur
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predictions made before taking the exam, as well as for predictions made after taking the
exam. Since the majority of participants tended to overestimate the exam score they
would earn, the participants with the higher GPA's tended to overestimate their exam
scores more than did the participants with the lower GPA's. Interestingly, Test Anxiety
Scale scores tended to moderate the tendency to overestimate exam scores. Test anxiety
negatively correlated with prediction error. The higher the test anxiety, the lower the
prediction error for predictions made before taking the exam and after taking the exam.
Test anxious participants tended to be more realistic in their exam score predictions,
although both depressed and nondepressed participants tended to overestimate the score
they would earn on the exam.
Exam score and overall grade point average correlated. Thus, those with higher
GPA's tended to earn better exam scores than those with low GPA's. Age and overall
grade point average were also positively correlated. This positive correlation suggests
that older students tended to have higher GPA's. Amount of time spent studying for the
fmal exam also positively correlated with age. Taken together, these results suggest that
older students tend to spend more time studying, to earn higher exam scores, and to earn
higher GPA's.
One limitation of the present study is that depression was defmed by the presence
or absence of depressive symptoms as reported on the BDI-ll. No attempt was made to
identify a body of research participants who were clinically diagnosed with a depressive
mental illness. Studies utilizing college students as participants are analogue studies and
may not actually represent the experiences of patients diagnosed with a depressive
illness. Coyne and Gotlib (1983) have criticized the research community because they
believe the majority of what is known about cognition in depression was learned from the
study of mildly depressed college students. They argue that elevated depression scores on
self-report questionnaires by college students represents mild and brief experiences of
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depression that are not comparable to more serious episodes of depressive illness. Coyne

.

and Gotlib point out that most depressed students who participate in studies recover from
their depression within three weeks and very few seek treatment. Hammen (1980, as cited
in Michael & Funabiki, 1985) found that many participants who were identified as
depressed on the basis of a BDI score of 16 or greater were nqt actually clinically
depressed. Sixty percent were not depressed when a diagnostic interview was added to
the selection criteria. It is possible that the absence of negative cognitive distortions in
the depressed participants in this study was the result of their depressive symptoms being
mild and temporary, and that the study of clinically diagnosed depressed patients would
have yielded different results. It is also possible that measuring students' levels of
depressive symptoms at final exam time introduces a confound into the study. That is,
students may be more depressed, more fatigued, more worried, and more sleep-deprived
at final exam time than at other times during the school year. However, this condition
may be quite transient; and depressive symptoms may pass away spontaneously as soon
as exams are over. Future studies may wish to focus on cognitive accuracy or distortion
in a clinically depressed population of participants such as people who are diagnosed
with depression and who are receiving treatment for this disorder.

If this study design

were repeated, it might also be wise to measure depressive symptoms using the BDI-II
several times prior to final exams and include in the depressed group only those students
who score consistently within the depressed range over a period of time.
Construct validity is somewhat limited by the use of college and graduate students
as participants in the present study. The results may not be widely generalizable beyond
student populations. It is uncertain, for instance, how much the results can be generalized
to those who never attended college.
Because this study utilized a correlational design, the participants were not
randomly assigned to the depressed and nondepressed conditions. Differences or their
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absence may not be due to the influence of depression as a variable. Instead, they may be
due to some extraneous variable. For instance, a student who obtains a 71 % and rates it as
highly satisfactory may not have had time to study and may be pleasantly surprised with
a passing grade. This variable is unrelated to the presence or absence of depression. Study
time is an historical artifact that cannot be completely ruled out as a factor influencing
I

exam score prediction or satisfaction because ofthe absence of random assignment to
groups. A follow-up study could be designed to overcome this. shortcoming by actually
manipulating the depression variable. There are experimental designs in which
participants are randomly assigned to the depressed and nondepressed groups. A mild
temporary depression is then created in the participants assigned to the depression group
by having them read lists of negative and unpleasant adjectives. Such an experiment
would be an alternative to the design presented here and may be an appropriate follow-up
to the present study.
It is also possible that depressed people tend to engage in hyperbole when

describing their negative thoughts; this hyperbole is not reflected in their actual written
estimates and predictions. Possibly, depressed people describe things in conversation that
suggest exaggerated negative distortions ofthought; but they dispense with those
negative exaggerations when asked to commit predictions, estimates, or evaluations to
paper.
In conclusion, the variable of depression score on the BDI-II did not significantly
affect the cognitive accuracy of exam score predictions, nor the satisfaction level with
earned exam scores for the students in this study. Neither the notion of negative cognitive
distortions among the depressed nor the notion of depressive realism was supported by
this research. A possible explanation of why negative distortions did not appear among
those with depressive symptoms may be the behavioral notion that those who are
depressed are more negative in their thinking because their actual life experiences are
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more negative. Thus, negative thinking among those who are depressed may actually be
,

accurate thinking by people in negative circumstances. It is also possible that analogue
research using college students as research participants, and using BDI-II scores to
measure depression does not accurately reflect the cognitive accuracy of patients who are
actually diagnosed with depressive disorders. Nevertheless, this study does not support
the notion that increased depressive symptoms coincide with increased negative
distortion in cognition. The predictions and evaluations, in.this study, of those with
higher depressive symptoms were no different than those with lower depressive
symptoms.
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Appendix A

Explanation Read to Participants at the Start a/the Study

You are being invited to participate in a doctoral dissertation research project. The
purpose ofthe study is to better understand some ofthe things that effect a student's
ability to guess the score he or she will earn on a course examination. We will also be
studying how satisfied students are with the scores they earn on an exam. The things
being studied include depression, anxiety, age, marital status, test anxiety, amount oftime
spent studying for the exam, and general level of psychological distress.
You are being asked to be in this research study because your professor has
agreed to allow this class to be part of the project. We hope you volunteer to be involved
in the study. However, you are completely free to decide not to be involved. If you do not
wish to take part, it will not affect your grade or affect you negatively in any way. If you
decide to be involved, you may change your mind and drop out of the study at any time
without any negative consequences to you.
If you decide to take part, it will involve approximately one hour of your class
time and about 18 minutes of your time just before and just after taking the fmal exam. If
you take part, you will be asked to complete 5 psychological questionnaires in class and
to provide some information about yourself such as your address, age, marital status,
race, and overall grade point average. Just before you take the exam for this course, you
will be asked to write down the score you think you will earn on the exam and how much
time you spent studying for the exam. When you complete the exam, you will be asked to
guess what score you earned on the exam. When your exam has been scored, you will be
informed of your score and asked your level of satisfaction with the score you received.
Neither your course instructor nor anyone at the University will know what score you
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predicted you would receive nor how satisfied you are with the score you receive. The
investigator will know this information as well as your exam score. All information will
be kept confidential.

If you do not wish to participate, you may leave class now. For those of you who
are staying, I would now like to read the informed consent fo~ to you and have you sign
it to acknowledge your voluntary participation in this study.
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AppendixB

nwORMEDCONSENTFORM

TITLE OF STUDY
Realism or Distortion in Predicting and Evaluating Exam Performance Among College
Students

PURPOSE

The purpose ofthis study is to better understand some of the things that affect a student's
ability to guess the score he or she will earn on a course examination. We will also be
studying how satisfied students are with the scores they earn on an exam. The things
being studied include depression, anxiety, age, marital status, test anxiety, amount of time
spent studying for the exam, and general level of psychological distress.

You are being asked to be in this research study because your professor has agreed to
allow this class to be part of the project. We hope you volunteer to be involved in the
study. However, you are completely free to decide not to be involved. If you do not wish
to take part, it will not affect your grade or affect you negatively in any way. If you
decide to be involved, you may change your mind and drop out ofthe study at any time
without any negative consequences to you.

INVESTIGATOR(S)

Name:

Michael J. Kinney, M.A. (responsible investigator)
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Department: . Psychology (doctoral candidate)
Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine
Address:

22 Kevin Road
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050

Phone:

(717) 697-2244

Name:

Elizabeth A. Gosch, Ph.D. (principle investigator)

Department:

Psychology

Address:

Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine
4190 City Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19131-1693

Phone:

(215) 871-6509

Name:

David C. Hill, Ph.D. (co-investigator)

Department:

Psychology

Address:

Millersville University
Byerly Hall, Room 208
Millersville, PA

Phone:

(717) 872-3089

Name:

David Rafael Castro-Blanco, Ph.D. ABPP, FAClinP (co-investigator)

Department:

Psychology

Address:

Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine
4190 City Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19131-1693
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The doctors and scientists at Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine (PCOM) do
research on diseases and new treatments. The study you are being asked to volunteer for
is part of a research project.

If you have any questions about this research, you can call Dr. Elizabeth A. Gosch at
(215) 871-6509.

If you have any questions or problems during the study, you can ask Dr. Gosch, who will
be available during the entire study. If you want to know more about Dr. Gosch's
background, or the rights of research subjects, you can call Dr. John Simelaro,
Chairperson, PCOM Institutional review Board at (215) 871-6337.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCEDURES

You will be asked to complete 5 psychological questionnaires including:
Beck Depression Inventory-II
Beck Anxiety Inventory
Brief Symptom Inventory
Attributional Style Questionnaire
Test Anxiety Scale
These 5 Questionnaires include a total of 180 questions and require from 33 to 55
minutes to complete. You will be asked to complete a form listing some information
about yourself such as your name, address, gender, age, race, marital status, current year
in school, academic major, and current overal1 grade point average. In addition, you will
be asked, just before and just after you take the course examination, to predict the exam
score you believe you will earn. You will also be asked to write down the amount of time
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you spent studying for the examination. When you learn your actual exam score, you will
,

be asked to write down how satisfied you are with your score. The investigator will also
know your exam score.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS

You may feel some satisfaction because you have personally taken part in a scientific
project from which new knowledge may come. You will also have the opportunity to
participate in doctoral research as part of your academic experience. In addition, you will
learn about 5 of the most often used psychological self-report questionnaires by actually
completing them yourself

You may not benefit directly from being in this study. However, other people may benefit
in the future from what the researchers learn.

RISKS AND DISCONIFORTS

There are no significant risks to subjects who take part in this study. Those who volunteer
will give approximately one hour of their time to complete forms and psychological selfreport questionnaires. Completing the questionnaires about personal thoughts and
feelings may cause some emotional discomfort or seem an intrusion upon your privacy.
However, these questionnaires are the most widely used instruments oftheir type and
have been used many times with no ill effects to either mentally healthy or mentally ill
subjects. Uyou feel distressed or upset by mental or emotional problems, we encourage
you to contact the Millersville University Department of Counseling and Human
Development for assistance. The Department of Counseling and Human Development
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can be found in Lyle Hall on the Millersville campus or reached by calling 872-3122. If
you report serious or dangerous mental health problems on the self-report questionnaires,
the investigators will contact you by mail to remind you of your opportunity to seek
counseling.

There are no known risk or discomforts that will result from being in this study.

ALTERNATIVES

Being involved in this study is completely voluntary, and there will not be any negative
consequences if you choose not to participate. If you choose to take part and then change
your mind at any time, you are free to withdraw.

PAYMENT

You will not receive any payment for being in this study.

CONFIDENTIALITY

All information and records relating to your involvement will be kept in a locked file.
Only the investigators, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, and members ofthe
Institutional Review Boards (IRB) of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine
and Millersville University will be able to look at these records. If the results ofthis study
are published, no names or other identifYing infonnation will be used. Your responses on
the self-report questionnaires will not be shared with anyone other than the investigators
and the IRB board members. If an investigator is also an instructor, he or she will not
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have access to your scores on the psychological questionnaires. Your prediction of your
exam score and your satisfaction with your exam score will not be shared with the course
instructor or anyone at the University.

REASONS YOU MAYBE TAKEN OUT OF THE STUDY WITHOUT YOUR
CONSENT

If your responses on the self-report questionnaires are incomplete, your data may not be
usable.

NEW FINDINGS

If any new information develops that may affect your willingness to stay in this study,
you will be told about it.

INmRY

If you are injured as a result of this research study, you will be provided with immediate
necessary medical care.

However, you will not be reimbursed for medical care or receive other payment. PCOM
will not be responsible for any of your bills, including any routine medical care under this
program or reimbursement for any side effects that may occur as a result of this program.

If you believe that you have suffered injury or illness in the course of this research, you
should notifY John Simelaro, D.O., Chairperson, PCOM Institutional Review Board at
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(215) 871-6337. A review by a committee will be arranged to determine if your injury or
illness is a result of your being in this research. You should also contact Dr. Simelaro if
you think that you have not been told enough about the risks, benefits, or other options,
or that you are being pressured to stay in this study against your wishes.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

You may refuse to be in this study. You voluntarily consent to be in this study with the
understanding of the known possible effects or hazards that might occur while you are in
this study. Not all the possible effects of the study are known.

You .may leave this study at any time.
You also understand that if you drop out of this study, there will be no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are entitled.

I have had adequate time to read this form and I understand its contents. I have been
given a copy for my personal records.

I agree to be in this research study.

Signature of Subject: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date: - -I- -I- -Time: - - - - - AMIPM
SignatureofWitness: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date: - -I- -I- -Time: - - - - -AMlPM
Signature ofInvestigator: ______. ._
Date:

Time:

._

.

- - - -AMlPM
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Appendix C

Subject Information Form
Please answer the following questions about yourself Information about your
individual answers will not be shared with your professor or apy member of the faculty or
administration of the university.

1. Name:
2. Address:

3. Age: _____________________________
4. Gender:
male

female

5. Race:
Caucasian
African-American
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Pacific Islander
Other
6. Marital status:
married
never-married
divorced
widowed

Realism or Distortion

7. Year in school:
1st year college
2nd year college
3rd year college
4th year college
,

5th year college
1st year graduate
2nd year graduate
3rd year graduate

8. Academic major:

9. Current overall grade-point average:

.----
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Appendix D

Example of the Letter Sent to Students Who Reported Dangerous Symptoms on the
Psychological Questionnaires.

(date)

(address)

Dear (student's name)

Thank you for participating in the dissertation research project being conducted in the
psychology classes at Millersville University. Your answers on the psychological
instruments administered as part of that research project suggested the area or areas of
concern that are designated below:
_ _ Thoughts of harming yourself
___ The urge to harm someone else
_~_

Depressive symptoms in the severe range

Please remember that if you should desire professional assistance to help you deal with
the concern or concerns listed above, the Millersville University Department of
Counseling and Human Development is available to you. Services can be obtained by
contacting them at:

Millersville University Department of Counseling and Human

Development
Lyle Hall
Millersville University
Phone: 872-3122
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If you have any questions about your results, please feel free to contact me at 717- 6972244. Thanks again for your participation.

Sincerely,

Michael J. Kinney
Doctoral candidate and responsible investigator

